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DIFFERENCE MADE LEGAL: 
THE COURT AND DR. KING 
David Luban * 
No set of legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart from the nar-
ratives that locate it and give it meaning. For every constitution there is 
an epic, for each decalogue a scripture. Once understood in the context 
of the narratives that give it meaning, law becomes not merely a system 
of rules to be observed, but a world in which we live. 
- Robert Covert 
No fact that is a cause is for that very reason historical. It becomes 
historical posthumously, as it were, through events that may be sepa-
rated from it by thousands of years. A historian who takes this as his 
point of departure stops telling the sequence of events like the beads of a 
rosary. Instead, he grasps the constellation which his own era has 
formed with a definite earlier one. Thus he establishes a conception of 
the present as the "time of the now" which is shot through with chips of 
Messianic time. 
- Walter Benjamin2 
Legal argument is a struggle for the privilege of recounting the 
past. To the victor goes the right to infuse a constitutional clause, or a 
statute, or a series of prior decisions with the meaning that it will 
henceforth bear by recounting its circumstances of origin and as-
signing its place in history. I shall call such a historical placement of 
legal materials a political narrative. A string of precedents, a legisla-
tive history, an examination of framers' intent are all political narra-
tives. To the victor goes also the right to recite what I shall call the 
local narrative constituting "the facts of the case at hand," and, follow-
ing on these two rights, the additional right to pronounce the corre-
spondence or mirroring of each narrative in the other that renders 
further argument unnecessary. 
* Professor of Law, University of Maryland. B.A. 1970, University of Chicago; M.A. (Phi-
losophy) 1973, M.Phil. (Philosophy) 1973, Ph.D. (Philosophy) 1974, Yale. - Ed. For their help 
in trying to bring earlier drafts of this Article under some semblance of control, I would like to 
thank David Bogen, Paul Kahn, Judith Lichtenberg, Richard Pildes, Peter Quint, Sara Vance, 
Robert Wachbroit, Steven Winter, and Gordon Young. 
1. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. 
REV. 4, 4-5 (1983). 
2. W. BENJAMIN, Theses on the Philosophy of History, in ILLUMINATIONS 255, 265 (H. Ar-
endt ed. 1968). The phrase "time of the now" translates "Jetztzeit," and refers (Benjamin's edi· 
tor tells us) to the mystical "standing now," the moment in which (to quote Henry IV Part I, Act 
v, sc. 4, II. 82-83) "time, that takes survey of all the world, must have a stop." Cf. W. BENJAMIN, 
supra, at 263 n.*. 
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By "correspondence" and "mirroring" I mean that legal argument 
aims to show that these facts precisely exemplify the, political problem 
that this body of law was intended to solve and, conversely, that the 
history of this body of law precisely prefigures the problem that led to 
the present litigation. To legitimize legal argument it is essential that 
the political and local narratives mirror each other precisely. For if an 
advocate or a judge were to admit that the legislative history or the 
precedents' in a case were ambiguous, or that the facts before the court 
failed to square with past political narratives in important respects, the 
argument would lose its aura of authority and invite a self-proliferat-
ing skepticism rather than conviction. It is to avoid this deflationary 
loss of aura that political and local narratives must dovetail in an im-
probable mutual correspondence that legitimizes both the favored con-
clusion and the political narrative that embeds it. 
Thus the framers of past law are endowed with a weak prophetic 
power of anticipating today's controversies, for a legal argument not 
only invokes and applies the political history but also sanctifies and 
canonizes their judgment. And the everyday business described in lo-
cal narratives is charged with the meaningfulness of recurrence or 
even predestination, for the facts of a case are not merely recited but 
also brought under the jurisdiction of a political narrative that reveals 
the case as a reenactment of an archetypal piece of the community's 
history. 
When you control the power of recounting history, you have there-
fore won a legal argument, for a legal argument is nothing but the 
confluence of a political narrative culminating in a proposition of law 
(which, as Cover suggests in my epigraph, attains meaning only when 
it is embedded in such a narrative) and a local narrative of events sur-
rounding the lives of the litigants. Forcing these two narratives into 
correspondence imparts whatever power of conviction legal argumen-
tation possesses. 
This accounts for an experience that most lawyers have had, 
namely reading a majority appellate opinion and at first blush finding 
it thoroughly convincing, its arguments flowing inevitably from the 
precedents and the facts; then reading a dissenting opinion and finding 
it equally compelling. When we closely compare the two, we find that 
the authors have recounted a carefully edited selection of the facts of 
the case - what I have called a local narrative - together with a 
precedential or constitutional or legislative history (a political narra-
tive) contrived to exhibit an (illusory?) correspondence with the local 
narrative. As Benjamin puts it in the passage I have taken as my sec-
ond epigraph, the author of a legal argument "grasps the constellation 
2154 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 87:2152 
which his own era has formed with a definite earlier one," and out of 
that constellation radiates the authority and conviction of the 
argument.3 
Historical time, Benjamin tells us elsewhere, is neither homogene-
ous nor empty.4 To recount a history is to align certain moments with 
each other so that the later moments reenact the earlier and recreate 
them as their precursors, in just the way that today's fashion suddenly 
and rather mysteriously attunes itself to the sensibility of an earlier 
time, using its styles as a trope through which we understand our own 
orientation to the world. 5 Historical time is a structure of such pair-
ings, mirrorings, affinities, backward causations, "constellations" 
formed by distinct epochs and episodes. (Since Watergate, journalists 
inevitably have abbreviated political scandals by coinages ending with 
the "-gate" suffix. Koreagate and Billygate and Contragate reenact 
Watergate and recreate it as their precursor.) Political narrative and 
local narrative, past and present, press into alignment and are ce-
mented together, as the jurist-storyteller literally narrates them into 
equivalence. The legal doctrine of stare decisis is nothing more than a 
formalist expression of the more fundamental juristic act of narrative 
imagination by which distinct historical episodes are fused into polit-
ical equivalence. 
Holmes was therefore wrong: The life of the law is neither logic 
nor experience, but narrative and the only partially civilized struggle 
for the power it conveys. To put the point in slightly different terms, 
legal argument is at bottom neither analytic nor empirical, but rather 
historical. The life of the law is not a vision of the future but a vision 
of the past; its passions are unleashed, to use Benjamin's words, "by 
the image of enslaved ancestors rather than that of liberated 
grandchildren. "6 
We are all familiar with the struggle for the privilege of recounting 
our large-scale political narratives. To take one example, liberals and 
Christian fundamentalists currently contend for the privilege of re-
counting the history of the establishment clause: was it, as the liberal 
would have it, a chapter in the effort to expunge the madness of reli-
gious war from civilization by expelling religion from politics; or was 
it, as some fundamentalists would have it, part of the saga of dissident 
3. W. BENJAMIN, supra note 2, at 265. 
4. Id. at 263. 
5. "The French Revolution viewed itself as Rome reincarnate. It evoked ancient Rome the 
way fashion evokes costumes of the past. Fashion has a flair for the topical, no matter where it 
stirs in the thickets of long ago; it is a tiger's leap into the past." Id. at 263. 
6. Id. at 263. 
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Christian sects, consolidating their right to prevent any one sect from 
triumphing over the others in what was nevertheless an officially God-
fearing republic?7 To the victor of the struggle go the spoils: the right 
to (re)tell the history of the establishment clause, including the self-
referential (indeed, viciously circular) right to (re)tell the history of 
that very struggle. And from that right will flow the further right to 
determine the future course of American institutions. The civil rights 
movement and the forces of segregation waged such a struggle over 
the narrative history of the equal protection clause. Similarly, antebel-
lum abolitionists strove vainly for the historian's scepter that would 
have allowed them to tell an anti-slavery history of the Constitution 
itself. 8 There is nothing mysterious about such battles: they are the 
stuff of doctrinal legal history. 
Equally important is the parallel power over local narratives, the 
power of the victor to build whatever facts he or she wishes into the 
fabric of legal decisions by (re)interpreting the record.9 Just as in the 
case of political narratives, losers endure not only the material burdens 
of defeat, but also the ignominy of helplessly witnessing their own past 
edited, their own voices silenced in the attempt to tell that past. 10 And 
thus the fight of those voices that have been silenced by the law - and 
those obviously include not only the voices of miscreants and justifia-
7. This is not merely a fundamentalist view; the idea that the establishment clause allows the 
government to support religion provided that it does so without preference among sects has been 
propounded by influential conservatives, including William Bennett, Edwin Meese, and Chief 
Justice Rehnquist. L. LEVY, THE EsTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT xi-xiii (1986). 
8. See generally R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED (1975). The reader may note that by recount-
ing these three episodes - abolitionism, civil rights, and secularism - as though they formed a 
series, I am myself offering a meaning-giving and hence controversial political narrative. To 
accept this narrative is to accept that the liberal view of the establishment clause is like the civil 
rights movement's view of the equal protection clause and the abolitionists' view of the Constitu-
tion as a whole: all of them manifest a repeated pattern according to which the meaning of the 
constitution lies in its promotion of cosmopolitanism - Jeffersonian enlightenment - over a 
backward sectarianism and particularism or racism. Anyone who accepts my series has already 
taken a large step toward accepting the value judgment toward which it is tacking, namely that 
the fundamentalist view of the establishment clause is as unenlightened and uncivilized as race 
segregation and slavery. Caveat lector! - political narrative is moral argument. 
9. As Judge Posner astutely remarks, the facts of appellate cases are usually too distorted for 
forensic purposes to ground sensible judgments of how the world really is. R. POSNER, THE 
PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE (forthcoming). 
10. In Nietzsche's words, "the text finally disappeared under the interpretation." F. NIETZ-
SCHE, BEYOND GooD AND EVIL 49 (Kaufman trans. 1966). Benjamin cautions the historical 
materialist historian thus: 
Whoever has emerged victorious participates to this day in the triumphal procession in 
which the present rulers step over those who are lying prostrate. According to traditional 
practice, the spoils are carried along in the procession. They are called cultural treasures, 
and a historical materialist views them with cautious detachment. For without exception 
the cultural treasures have an origin which he cannot contemplate without horror. 
W. BENJAMIN, supra note 2, at 258. 
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bly unsuccessful litigants, but also the voices of racial minorities, of 
women, of homosexuals, of the poor - is, as Benjamin put it, "the 
fight for the oppressed past." 11 
It is a fight that can be joined (though not won) by resuscitating 
those voices and coming to understand how they organize legal mater-
ials, how they embed these materials in narratives, how they mirror 
local narratives in political narratives. It is a fight that requires in 
addition some understanding of the forensic limitations of these narra-
tives - ultimately, of whether they subvert their own power to 
convince. 
My aim in this essay is to contrast two legal retellings of the same 
event: a set of demonstrations sponsored by the Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference in Birmingham, Alabama in 1963 that led to 
the arrest and incarceration of Martin Luther King, Jr. One is the 
Supreme Court majority opinion in Walker v. City of Birmingham, 
sustaining King's conviction;12 the other, King's own defense of his 
actions in his Letter from Birmingham Jail 13 I wish to show how the 
self-same event entails radically different legal consequences when it 
appears in different narratives, one the Supreme Court's official voice, 
the other the excluded voice of one of the defendants whose condem-
nation the Supreme Court affirmed. In each, I shall be focusing on 
aspects usually thought of as literary or "rhetorical": the structure of 
narrative, the voice, the range of allusion, the questions that the au-
thors intended to invoke and - equally importantly - those they 
hoped or had to forestall. If "rhetorical" is meant to indicate convic-
tion through narrative rather than logical procedures, I accept the la-
bel; if "rhetorical" is meant to contrast with legitimate argumentation, 
I reject it. For I have been claiming so far that legal argument gains 
legitimacy just to the extent that it is able to ground the authority of 
its own narratives. The criticisms I shall offer of both the Court's 
opinion and King's Letter are criticisms of narrative vision as much as 
logical coherence. 
Walker and King's Letter explicitly raise the theme of the legiti-
macy of political authority and thus of disobedience to authority. The 
11. W. BENJAMIN, supra note 2, at 265. 
12. 388 U.S. 307 (1967) (criminal contempt conviction of King and other demonstrators for 
violating injunction not invalidated by likely unconstitutionality of injunction). 
13. M.L. KING, Letter from Birmingham Jail. in WHY WE CAN'T WAIT 77 (1963) [hereinaf-
ter KING, Letter]. Since much of my essay consists of a close reading of the Walker opinion and 
King's Letter. a reader may be well advised to read through them first; neither is especially 
lengthy. Indeed, since much of my argument at the beginning and end of the present essay is 
drawn from W. BENJAMIN, supra note 2, I shall have the temerity to suggest reading these as 
well (they amount to only 11 pages). 
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themes of narrative and authority are related in that the state's claim 
to its citizens' unconditional obedience presupposes that officials' nar-
ratives, local as well as political, occupy a privileged, canonical status. 
Why should that be?14 Previously, I have spoken as though the win-
ner of a legal argument gets to recount its central narratives. But of 
course that is not true, if by "winner" we mean "winning litigant." In 
each and every case a government official, a judge, preempts the histo-
rian's scepter. Can this particular piece of victor's history provide its 
own validation? This is the deep question raised in Walker, and part 
of my project is to suggest that the answer is no. 
Legal narrative and legal authority, then, form two of the themes I 
shall be exploring. These two themes together point us to a third, one 
that in any event arises directly from a reading of King's Letter. 
Throughout history, narrative and normative authority have been suc-
cessfully fused in just one canonical case; it is the only one in which 
the bare recounting of events grounds its own authenticity and the 
normative authority of the narrator. I am speaking, of course, of holy 
scriptures, theogonies. As we shall see, Martin Luther King's Letter 
embeds the Birmingham demonstrations in a biblical narrative that 
adds immeasurably to the power of his argument by invoking scrip-
tural history. 
In addition to his numerous biblical allusions, King offers secular 
political narratives and arguments, and these form a more obvious 
point of comparison with the Walker opinion. But one of the conjec-
tures I shall be exploring is that even purely secular arguments are 
able to connect normative authority with narrative only by adopting 
an essentially religious or theological stance toward their narrative 
materials, and I shall suggest that Walker parallels the biblical por-
tions of King's Letter fully as much as it does the secular. 
Let ine illustrate what I mean by "secular arguments adopting an 
essentially theological stance." In his interesting book Constitutional 
Faith, 15 Sanford Levinson investigates some of the ways in which 
Americans - citizens and judges alike - invest the (secular) Consti-
tution with religious or divine properties. Madison described constitu-
tions as "political scriptures"; Jefferson referred to the Philadelphia 
Convention as "an assembly of demigods"; Washington asked that 
"the Constitution be sacredly maintained"; Lincoln spoke of "rever-
14. This is the question that preoccupies Cover, supra note 1. His answer is that it shouldn't 
be, that even the narrative interpretations of the law offered by the United States Supreme Court 
have no special claims to validity. Id. at 28; see also s. LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 27-
53 (1988). It will be obvious to readers of Cover's essay that it has decisively influenced my own 
argument throughout the present Article. 
15. s. LEVINSON, supra note 14. 
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ence for the laws" as the "political religion of the nation." 16 These 
metaphors were not meant figuratively; they were grounded in 
Madison's insight that the "complicated form of [the American] polit-
ical system . . . requires a more than common reverence for author-
ity," 17 a reverence that demands a transference of religious sentiments 
to the Constitution. 
This, moreover, is not the only example of comprehending secular 
political institutions through religious categories, for Levinson con-
vincingly demonstrates that major political debates about the Consti-
tution involve positions that correspond directly with familiar 
religious controversies. Thus, for example, the current debate between 
constitutional textualists, who claim that constitutional truth lies 
wholly within the document's "four corners," and constitutional com-
mon lawyers, who claim that judicial opinions interpreting the Consti-
tution are just as much constitutional law as the document itself, 
corresponds to a familiar argument between Luther and the Catholic 
Church about whether Church commentary forms part of the meaning 
of Holy Writ. 18 If Levinson is correct, the existence of a "protestant/ 
catholic" split in constitutional interpretation may be explained by the 
fact that the Constitution has become an essentially religious object. 
I shall be exploring the thesis that authoritative narratives more 
generally - and specifically the Walker opinion and King's Letter, 
including its distinctively secular portions - are best understood 
through theological categories. Therein may lie their power, but also 
their danger: faith unites, but it also divides. It moves mountains, but 
a moving mountain can crush those who live on its slopes and in its 
path. (To make my own position clear from the outset: I am deeply 
dismayed and fearful of the incursions by organized religion into our 
national politics; at the same time, however, I am persuaded that poli-
tics may best be understood - and worthwhile political action fur-
thered - when we realize that even in its secular guise political action 
is through-and-through theological in character. I turn to these ques-
tions explicitly in the concluding pages of this essay.) 
Thus a deep connection exists among three apparently disparate 
themes arising from Walker and King's Letter: the narration of his-
tory, the foundation of authority, and the treacherous confluence of 
religion and politics. There is a fourth theme as well, of course, and 
16. Quoted in id. at 10, 14. 
17. Quoted in id. at 10. 
18. Id. at 18-53. Levinson, following Thomas Grey, points out that similar controversies 
over the status of commentary on holy writ have occurred in Islam and Judaism as well as 
Christianity. Id. at 19. See Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1, 7 (1984). 
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that is how we are best to understand the civil rights movement. It is a 
movement whose aims were at once secular and religious: it aimed to 
achieve equal rights, but also to redeem America from its racism. The 
movement was in many ways utopian, and in many ways it failed in 
both of its tasks. yet it undeniably achieved remarkable successes as 
well, and in a sense the civil rights movement has become an icon and 
exemplar of grassroots organizing for progressive social change. In 
the concluding sections of this essay I shall explore the successes and 
failures of the movement by linking these to the other themes I have 
just catalogued (narrative, authority, and the nexus between religion 
and politics). 
Why do I choose these events and these two retellings of them? 
All were famous in their day, but they go largely unnoticed now. 
Since I have borrowed so much already from Benjamin's Theses on the 
Philosophy of History (the greatest work on the philosophy of history 
known by me), I shall borrow once more. "To articulate the past his-
torically," Benjamin writes, "means to seize hold of a memory as it 
flashes up at a moment of danger." 19 The image is striking: we are to 
think of the unconscious mind pitching in to save us from a sudden 
threat by reminding us of something we had otherwise forgotten (a 
name, a telephone number, where we mislaid the key, whatever). We 
do not traffick in history for its own sake, according to Benjamin, but 
because a particular moment of the past is of use in a particular pres-
ent situation. (They are, to return to my earlier image, mirrored in 
each other.) 
In my view, we live in terrible danger today. The danger, quite 
simply, is that we are on the verge of becoming an irredeemably racist 
society: a society in which the possibilities celebrated in Martin Lu-
ther King's "I have a dream" oration - "all of God's children -
black men and white men, Jews and Gentiles, Protestants and 
Catholics - will be able to join hands and sing in the words of the old 
Negro spiritual, 'Free at last, free at last; thank God Almighty, we are 
free at last.'" - are finally foreclosed.20 Today we are faced with 
statistical indicators of residential segregation almost as high as they 
were before mass desegregation began - residential segregation, 
moreover, that appears to be based on race alone, rather than on mat-
ters of economics.21 We confront a staggering degree of emiseration 
19. W. BENJAMIN, supra note 2, at 257. 
20. For the crucial passages of this speech, see D. GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS: MARTIN 
LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE 283-84 (1986). 
21. On the statistical indicators of segregation, see R. FARLEY & w. ALLEN, THE COLOR 
LINE AND THE QUALITY OF LIFE IN AMERICA 141 (1987) (on a 100 point scale, residential 
segregation in the twenty-five U.S. cities with the largest black population averaged 88 in 1960 
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among poor blacks, including abbreviated life expectancies unheard of 
in so-called first world countries and mortality rates vastly greater 
than those among whites;22 and we find a terrifying lack of political 
interest in these problems among whites. Today we face an unremit-
and 81 in 1980). Denton and Massey have recently found that blacks (and black Puerto Ricans) 
alone among American ethnic groups remain at extraordinarily high levels of residential segrega· 
tion regardless of improvement in income. Denton & Massey, Residential Segregation of Blacks, 
Hispanics, and Asians by Socioeconomic Status and Generation, 69 Soc. Sci. Q. 797, 813-14 
(1988). 
22. R. FARLEY & W. ALLEN, supra note 21, provides a wealth of horrendous detail concern· 
ing the emiseration of black Americans. Analyzing census data, they find that black male life 
expectancy is six years less than white male, while black female life expectancy is five years less 
than white female. Id. at 57. The 1950 mortality rate among black females was 172% that of 
white females; it has decreased, but in 1983 it was still 150% that of white females. The mortal-
ity rate of black men has increased from 143% that of white men in 1950 to 146% that of white 
men in 1983. Id. at 42-43. As for life expectancies: the life expectancy of black males in 
America is 64 years, which is comparable to average male life expectancy in Brazil, Colombia, 
Hungary, Malaysia, Mexico, North and South Korea, Poland, the Soviet Union, and Syria - but 
an average of nine years less than in the First World countries of Australia, Canada, France, 
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Spain, the United Kingdom, and West Germany. Similarly, American 
black women have an average life expectancy of 72 years, which is an average of six and two-
thirds years less than women in the First World countries and comparable to that of women in 
Mexico, North and South Korea, Rumania, the Soviet Union, Sri Lanka, and Venezuela. For 
American black life expectancies, see id. at 53; for foreign life expectancies, see BUREAU OF THE 
CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL AB5fRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1988 at 
800. 
Canvassing a number of sources, Alan Hutchison has provided a grim, even terrifying, sum· 
mary of the emergency conditions under which we live. Omitting his citations, I quote it in full: 
Percentage of black children who live below the poverty line: 47.3. 
Percentage of nonblack Americans who say that there should be a law against interracial 
marriage: 28. 
Percentage of nonblack Americans who say that blacks "should not push themselves 
where they are not wanted": 58. 
Chance that a white male in the U.S. will be murdered in a given year: 1 in 9927. 
Chance that a black male in the U.S. will be murdered in a given year: 1 in 1539. 
Percentage of black high school graduates over 16 who are unemployed: 18.3. 
Percentage of white high school dropouts under 25 who are unemployed: 15.2. 
Percentage of blacks unemployed in 1984: 17.2. 
Percentage of whites unemployed in 1984: 7.2. 
Percentage increase in ratio of black to white unemployment rates between 1965 and 
1984: 20. 
Percentage of elected officials who were black in 1985: 1.2. 
Percentage of black families below poverty level: 32.4. 
Percentage of white families at poverty level: 9.7. 
Ratio of male black children dying in first year of life to male white children dying in 
first year of life: 1.8 to 1. 
Percentage of persons in New Orleans who are black: 50. 
Percentage of qualified applicants for police in New Orleans who are black: 40. 
Percentage of police officers in New Orleans who are black: 2. 
Chance of an American being in state prison on any given day: 1 in 800. 
Chance of a black male American being in state prison on any given day: 1 in 33. 
Median income for all black families in 1983: $14,506. 
Median income for all white families in 1983: $25,757. 
Median income of black families as a percentage of that of white families in 1970: 61. 
Median income of black families as a percentage of that of white families in 1983: 56. 
Percentage increase in black unemployment rate from 1972-1982: 82. 
Percentage increase in white unemployment rate from 1972-1982: 69. 
Hutchison, Indiana Dworkin and Law's Empire, 96 YALE L.J. 637, 662-64 (1987) (citations 
omitted). 
August 1989] The Court and Dr. King 2161 
ting tide of white ill will toward blacks, and this past term the 
Supreme Court has affirmatively allied itself with the politics of white 
resentment. 23 As the Court metamorphoses into an enemy of King's 
dream, it is worth recollecting an earlier clash between that dream and 
the Court's authority. For we live, additionally, in a society in which 
challenges to what might be called "the authority of authority" - the 
self-justifying legitimacy of official action - seem (to me at least) re-
markably tepid and increasingly fragile. Finally, ours is an epoch in 
which religion and religious frenzy have erupted furiously into politics 
nationally as well as internationally. For what it is worth, the follow-
ing essay is the memory that flashes up to me at this moment of 
danger. 
Apparently I am not alone in my recollection. Within the last two 
years, two Pulitzer Prize-winning biographies of Martin Luther King 
have been published and received with interest and acclaim, and PBS 
aired a six-hour series on the history of the civil rights movement.24 It 
23. Numerous analyses of the 1988 presidential election pointed to so-called "white collars" 
- white areas surrounding black ghettoes - as the decisive Republican enclaves. Juan Williams 
has argued persuasively that every domestic election issue pressed by Ronald Reagan and George 
Bush coded some race-related issue: 
[Reagan] made the litmus test for court nominees that they "interpret the law not legislate" 
- strong code words for those whites still stung by the desegregation ordered by activist 
courts. 
Where Reagan used the "welfare queen" collecting checks in her Cadillac to appeal to 
white racial hostilities in the 1980 campaign, his heir, George Bush, used Willie Horton, the 
wild-eyed black man who raped a suburban white woman. Where Reagan attacked "big 
government" for raising taxes to create new social programs (to aid blacks), Bush attacks 
the American Civil Liberties Union for defending criminals, appealing to the white percep-
tion that blacks are responsible for virtually all violent crime. 
Williams, Divided We Fell: Race and the '88 Election, Wash. Post, Nov. 20, 1988, at DI, col. 4. 
Election demographics amply bear out the racial analysis of the result. On the increase of ex-
plicit white racism in a typical American high school, see Welsh, A Lesson in Racism, Wash. 
Post, Mar. 5, 1989, at Cl, col. 1. For an analysis of data up to 1983, see H. SCHUMAN, C. STEEH 
& L. BOBO, RACIAL ATTITUDES IN AMERICA: TRENDS AND INTERPRETATIONS 193-97 (1985) 
(attitudinal survey data shows that white commitment to equality in principle is high, but white 
commitment to practical implementation of this principle is well below fifty percent for all major 
issues except public accommodations). 
The Court's anti-affirmative action decisions are Jett v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 109 S.Ct. 
2702 (1989) (municipality may not be held liable for its employees' violations of§ 1981 under a 
respondeat superior theory; § 1983 provides the exclusive federal damage remedy for the violation 
of rights guaranteed by§ 1981 when the claim is pressed against a state actor); Martin v. Wilks, 
109 S. Ct. 2180 (1989) (white city employees who had failed to intervene in earlier employment 
discrimination proceedings resulting in the entering of consent decrees held not precluded from 
bringing suit challenging promotion decisions made pursuant to those decrees); Wards Cove 
Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989) (statistical evidence of low proportion of non-
whites in higher level positions and high proportion of nonwhites in lower level positions held 
not to establish prima facie case of disparate impact violating Title VII); City of Richmond v. 
J.A. Croson, Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989) (Richmond, Virginia's 30% minority set-aside program 
held to be neither justified by sufficiently compelling governmental interests nor sufficiently nar-
rowly drawn to remedy effects of past discrimination). 
24. The biographies are D. GARROW, supra note 20 and T. BRANCH, PARTING THE WA-
TERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1954-63 (1988); the PBS series was Eyes on the Prize (PBS 
1986). 
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is hardly surprising that in a time of racial crisis the memory of King 
and the 1954-1968 civil rights movement resonates with renewed 
strength. For this movement, many of the accomplishments of which 
are threatened in our contemporary political climate, stands in need of 
redemption in just the way that it redeemed the failed promises of the 
civil rights amendments to the Constitution. 
I. PROJECT CONFRONTATION 
In January 1963, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference 
(SCLC) held a retreat in Georgia to discuss strategy for a concerted 
attack on segregation in Birmingham, Alabama. 25 Project C - for 
"confrontation" - would consist of demonstrations and boycotts of 
Birmingham's downtown businesses during the normally busy Easter 
shopping season. 
Birmingham itself had recently begun to display some sentiment 
for change in its segregationist ways. A group of whites headed by the 
Chamber of Commerce president campaigned to alter Birmingham's 
municipal government by abolishing the offices of the three segrega-
tionist commissioners (including the notoriously racist Commissioner 
of Public Safety, Theophilus Eugene "Bull" Connor) who then ran the 
city. The voters agreed to move to a mayoral system, and in a special 
election Connor was defeated by a more moderate segregationist 
named Albert Boutwell. Connor went to court to demand that he be 
allowed to finish his term of office as Commissioner of Public Safety;26 
and while this matter was pending Birmingham was governed by what 
was in effect two city governments, each passing its own laws and con-
ducting city business after its own fashion; municipal checks were 
signed by both Connor and Boutwell. Some Birmingham whites 
hoped that SCLC would cancel the Easter demonstrations in order to 
give the new government a chance to show what it could do; but the 
SCLC leadership - which had previously cancelled demonstrations to 
allow the run-off election between Connor and Boutwell to proceed 
without the pressure of demonstrations - went ahead with Project C. 
A Birmingham city ordinance required the demonstrators to ob-
tain a parade permit from the city commission. On April 3, Mrs. Lola 
Hendricks, representing the demonstrators, approached Connor to re-
25. My account of these events is drawn from T. BRANCH, supra note 24, at 688·747; D. 
GARROW, supra note 20, at 225-67; M.L. KING, supra note 13; J. WILLIAMS, EYES ON THE 
PRIZE: AMERICA'S CIVIL RIGHTS YEARS 1954-65, at 181-89 (1987); and especially A. WESTIN 
& B. MAHONEY, THE TRIAL OF MARTIN LUTHER KING (1974), as well as from the Walker 
opinion. 
26. See Connor v. State, 153 So. 2d 787 (Ala. 1963); see also Reid v. City ofBirmingham, 150 
So. 2d 735 (Ala. 1963). 
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quest a permit; Connor replied "No, you will not get a permit in Bir-
mingham, Alabama to picket. I will picket_ you over to the City Jail." 
On April 5 - one week before Good Friday·- Connor replied to a 
second, telegraphic, request for a parade permit with another refusal. 
The demonstrators proceeded with their protests. 
Project C included plans for the Reverend Martin Luther King, 
Jr., to place himself in a position to be arrested on Good Friday, April 
12. Late Wednesday evening, April 10, Connor obtained an ex parte 
injunction from Alabama Circuit Court Judge W.A. Jenkins, Jr., for-
bidding civil rights leaders, including all the leaders of Project C, from 
taking part in or encouraging demonstrations. The injunction was 
served at 1 A.M. on Thursday, and the SCLC leadership debated how 
to respond to it. King feared that complying with the injunction 
would deflate the protest, as had happened the previous summer in 
Albany, Georgia. He went ahead with the planned demonstration the 
following day, and was arrested; a second demonstration took place on 
Easter Sunday, April 14. Subsequently Judge Jenkins found several of 
the demonstrators guilty of criminal contempt and sentenced each of 
them (including King) to five days in jail and a $50 fine.27 It is this 
conviction that the Walker Court upheld. 
This ends the sequence of events recounted in Walker and King's 
Letter. But the larger chronicle of the Birmingham campaign did not 
end with King's arrest. Subsequently the demonstrators embarked on 
a strategy of marches by school children, leading to literally thousands 
of arrests. As the demonstrations continued, Bull Connor upped the 
level of official response, ordering that fire hoses and police dogs be 
turned on the demonstrators. Television news horrified its audiences 
with the spectacle of children bowled over by hoses that hit with 
enough force to rip the bark off trees. White moderates and the SCLC 
leadership undertook negotiations that led to a settlement announced 
on May 10. On May 11, the Ku Klux Klan staged a rally; after the 
meeting, the motel at which King had been staying and the home of 
his brother were bombed. Crowds of angry blacks rioted, and eventu-
ally President Kennedy sent in federal troops.28 A month later, Ala-
bama Governor George Wallace personally blocked the entrance of a 
University of Alabama building to prevent the entrance of two black 
students whose admission had been ordered by a federal court. Evi-
dently this was the last straw. That same day, President Kennedy 
spoke on national television to announce that he was seeking compre-
27. For an account of the trial, see A. WESTIN & B. MAHONEY, supra note 25, at 95·126, 
141-42. 
28. T. BRANCH, supra note 24, at 756-802. 
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hensive civil rights legislation that eventually became the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964. The summer ended with the March on Washington at 
which King delivered his "I have a dream" oration; in a sense, the 
civil rights act and the march were the culminating events of Project 
c. 
But let us return to King's original April arrest. While King was 
in jail, eight white clergyman - significantly, they were liberals who 
had publicly opposed Governor George Wallace's "Segregation For-
ever!" speech29 took out a full-page advertisement in the Birmingham 
News denouncing the demonstrators' actions. King responded from 
his cell, writing in the newspaper's margins until he was able to obtain 
paper; after he was permitted visitors, King's manuscript was typed by 
his friends and returned to him in jail for revisions. His Letter from 
Birmingham Jail attracted little attention at first.Jo It was eventually 
printed by the American Friends Service Committee and reprinted in 
numerous periodicals; it is perhaps the most famous document to 
emerge from the civil rights movement.JI 
At their contempt hearing, the civil rights leaders averred that the 
parade permit ordinance and Judge Jenkins' ex parte injunction were 
unconstitutional; the judge, however, refused to consider the issue, 
since the demonstrators had never attempted to get the injunction dis-
solved. Eventually the United States Supreme Court agreed that the 
ordinance on which the injunction rested was unconstitutional.J2 
Nevertheless, the Court in Walker declined to overturn the demon-
strators' convictions for criminal contempt, holding that even a consti-
tutionally questionable court order must be obeyed - the so-called 
"Mine Workers rule" derived from United States v. United Mine 
Workers.JJ 
Point and counterpoint: King's Letter has become one of the great 
classics in the literature of civil disobedience, both for its philosophy 
and for the soul-stirring magnificence of its language. No one has 
called Potter Stewart's Walker opinion a classic (in what might be 
called the literature of civil obedience), but its status as a Supreme 
Court precedent makes it the functional equivalent of a "classic. "J4 
Both Walker and the Letter address an ancient question, a question 
that more than any other defines the very subject of legal philosophy: 
29. Id. at 738. 
30. Id. at 744. 
31. For a detailed account of the letter's composition, see id. at 737-45. 
32. Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969). 
33. 330 U.S. 258 (1947). 
34. Roughly: a classic is a piece you can't ignore when you write in the canon. 
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that, of course, is the question of whether we lie under an obligation to 
obey unjust legal directives, including directives ordering our punish-
ment for disobeying other unjust directives. All political philosophy, 
from Plato's Apology and Crito on, is driven by this question; all our 
political hopes and aspirations are contained in the descriptive and 
argumentative materials we use to answer it. It is those materials that 
form our topic. 35 
II. The Walker Decision 
A. The Na"ative of Authority 
How does one describe a legally significant event? There is, I haz-
ard, no such thing as an absolutely neutral description of the facts -
"writing degree zero"36 - and one's choice of focus, of beginning and 
end, and of voice may already contain the answers to crucial 
questions. 
The Court's Walker opinion adopts the voice and viewpoint of 
governmental authority and recites a simple story of authority vindi-
cated. As we shall see, authority is the protagonist, the subject of the 
narrative, and the narrative itself is simple and straightforward. Au-
thority takes prudent (if possibly excessive) precautions to protect the 
community against danger. Well-meaning but shortsighted demon-
strators recklessly bypass those precautions. All of authority's worst 
fears are subsequently confirmed. Then the demonstrators attempt to 
avoid legal accountability for their actions. Needless to say - and 
after such a narrative, it is indeed needless to say - the Court declines 
to assist them in this enterprise. 
Stewart's opinion begins (without introduction) with unnamed 
"city officials" going to court to obtain their injunction; in this narra-
tive, therefore, an official act is the initiating event, and city officials 
are its protagonists. Stewart provides no background or context for 
the demonstrations or the demonstrators' motives; nor does he provide 
any clue to the segregationist history and predilections of Birmingham 
35. There is, to be sure, this difference between the questions raised by Walker and King's 
Letter: Walker is concerned with the obligation to obey unconstitutional directives (whether or 
not they are just), whereas King is concerned with the obligation to obey unjust directives 
(whether or not they are constitutional). Yet clearly the inquiries are close to each other in spirit, 
and there may be significant substantive overlap as well: an unconstitutional directive is at least 
prima facie unjust since it amounts to an illegitimate exercise of authority, and an unjust direc-
tive may run afoul of the constitutional principles of due process and equal protection. 
36. Writing degree zero: "a colourless writing .... The new neutral writing takes its place 
in the midst of all those ejaculations and judgments, without becoming involved in any of them; 
it consists precisely in their absence .... it deliberately foregoes any elegance or ornament .... " 
R. BARTHES, WRITING DEGREE ZERO AND ELEMENTS OF SEMIOLOGY 76-78 (A. Lavers & c. 
Smith trans. 1967). 
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or of Bull Connor; nor does he allude to the fact that the lame duck 
commissioners were in their last three days of office after having been 
voted out in what amounted to a referendum on their racial policies. 
He merely quotes the allegations by "officials of Birmingham" that the 
demonstrations were "'calculated to provoke breaches of the peace,' 
'threaten[ed] the safety, peace and tranquility of the City,' and placed 
'an undue burden and strain upon the manpower of the Police 
Department.' " 37 
He then devotes three paragraphs to insinuations that as events 
subsequently unfolded these official fears were fully confirmed. In the 
first of these paragraphs, he quotes an angry complaint by one of the 
petitioners that in past demonstrations state courts had favored local 
law enforcement, and "if the police couldn't handle it, the mob 
would,''38 thus suggesting that even the demonstrators understood the 
potential dangers of such confrontations. 39 The next paragraph notes 
that on Good Friday "a large crowd gathered,'' the onlookers " 'clap-
ping, and hollering, and [ w ]hooping.' " Members of this crowd 
"spilled" out into the street. 40 
Stewart's third descriptive paragraph portrays the Easter Sunday 
demonstration in the,following terms: "Some 300 or 400 people from 
among the onlookers followed in a crowd that occupied the entire 
width of the street and overflowed onto the sidewalks. Violence oc-
curred. Members of the crowd threw rocks that injured a newspaper-
man and damaged a police motorcycle."41 The reference to a crowd 
overflowing onto the sidewalks, like the earlier reference to a crowd 
37. Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 309 (1967). 
38. 388 U.S. at 310. 
39. As they surely did: less than two years before, the Freedom Riders were brutalJy beaten 
when their bus arrived at the Birmingham terminal, after the Birmingham police had agreed to 
give the Ku Klux Klan fifteen uninterrupted minutes to assault the riders. T. BRANCH, supra 
note 24, at 420. Such circumstances raise in a graphic way, however, the question of why the 
demonstrations should be halted rather than monitored and protected. King raises this question 
explicitly: 
In your statement you assert that our actions, even though peaceful, must be condemned 
because they precipitate violence. But is this a logical assertion? Isn't this like condemning 
a robbed man because his possession of money precipitated the evil act of robbery? Isn't this 
like condemning Socrates because his unswerving commitment to truth and his philosophi· 
cal inquiries precipitated the act by the misguided populace in which they made him drink 
hemlock? Isn't this like condemning Jesus because his unique God-consciousness and 
never-ceasing devotion to God's will precipitated the evil act of crucifixion? 
KING, Letter. supra note 13, at 85. 
40. 388 U.S. at 310-11. 
41. 388 U.S. at 311. Note the construction "Violence occurred." By making "violence" the 
subject of the sentence Stewart obviates the necessity of attributing the violence, though in the 
next sentence he explains that "members of the crowd," not the demonstrators, threw rocks. As 
Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion points out, there were only three rock-throwers, and the 
rock-throwing occurred after (in anger at?) the arrest of King, Shuttlesworth, and Walker. 388 
U.S. at 341 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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spilling out into the street, is intended to buttress the Court's subse-
quent argument validating "the strong interest of state and local gov-
ernments in regulating the use of their streets and other public places" 
since "the free passage of traffic and the prevention of public disorder 
and violence become important objects of legitimate state concern."42 
The three paragraphs also introduce a second theme: the willful-
ness of the demonstrators. The demonstrators distributed a statement 
"declaring their intention to disobey the injunction";43 they "an-
nounced that '[i]njunction or no injunction we are going to march to-
morrow' ";44 "calls for volunteers to 'walk' and go to jail were 
made."45 And the angry complaint that state courts favored anti-dem-
onstration local law enforcement suggests that the demonstrators had 
little respect for state courts. 
Thus, the Court's exposition of facts has consisted so far of a 
theme - the city officials' justifiable concerns about the forthcoming 
demonstrations - a second theme - the demonstrators' defiant inten-
tions - and a tragic climax, the vindication of authority as its fears 
were born out in the event by whooping and hollering crowds spilling 
into the street and by violence. The Court immediately lays this so-
nata-form exposition next to the rule of law that an "injunction duly 
issuing out of a court of general jurisdiction with equity powers upon 
pleadings properly invoking its action, and served upon persons made 
parties therein and within the jurisdiction, must be obeyed by them 
however erroneous the action of the court may be .... "46 
Only then does the Court frame its legal issue: 
We are asked to say that the Constitution compelled Alabama to allow 
the petitioners to violate this injunction, to organize and engage in these 
mass street parades and demonstrations, without any previous effort on 
their part to have the injunction dissolved or modified, or any attempt to 
secure a parade permit in accordance with its terms.47 
Framed this way, the legal question is of course self-answering; but 
it also provokes from the Court a further description of the facts of the 
42. 388 U.S. at 315-16. As we shall see, the very fact that the Court found it necessary to 
make this argument points to a fundamental problem with the Court's opinion. 
43. 388 U.S. at 310. 
44. 388 U.S. at 310. 
45. 388 U.S. at 311. 
46. 388 U.S. at 314 (quoting Howat v. Kansas, 258 U.S. 181, 189-90 (1922)). Note the 
rhythmic concatenation of formulaic legalisms piled one on top of the other. Rhetorically, this · 
serves the function of infusing the conclusion with a sense of syllogistic inevitability. (What are 
all those carefully catalogued legalisms doing there unless they are minor premises of a deductive 
application of some rule of law presumably known by the Court? Therefore the conclusion must 
be right.) 
47. 388 U.S. at 315. 
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case that is worthy of note. According to the Court, the petitioners 
had not made "any attempt to secure a parade permit in accordance 
with [the injunction's] terms"; they "did not apply for a permit either 
to the commission itself or to any commissioner after the injunction 
issued."48 Now in fact, Mrs. Lola Hendricks, a member of the peti-
tioners' organization, had attempted to obtain a parade permit before 
the injunction issued, and had been threatened with jail by Bull Con-
nor (who also turned down a second request). Inasmuch as it was 
Connor and the other commissioners who obtained the injunction, it is 
plain enough that they were not about to issue the parade permit the 
next day, and so the Court is clearly insisting on a formality for for-
mality's sake alone. The Court mentions the Hendricks incident, but 
stresses that Mrs. Hendricks was "not a petitioner in this case."49 This 
was literally true, but the Court is being a bit cute at this point by 
ignoring the fact that she represented the petitioners' organization and 
sought the permit on the organization's behalf. This fact evidently has 
no relevance, and so it disappears from the narrative - it is of a piece 
with the remarkable absence of civil rights organizations and the civil 
rights movement from Stewart's dramatis personae. The very exist-
ence of political collectivities other than governmental authority is 
missing from the Court's narrative vocabulary - only government 
and individuals (sometimes acting alone, sometimes whooping it up in 
unstructured mobs) form a part of Walker's ontology. 
In any event, Connor "had . . . made clear that he was without 
power to grant the permit alone, since the issuance of such permits 
was the responsibility of the entire city commission."50 Now Chief 
Justice Warren alluded in his dissenting opinion to claims made by the 
petitioners that "parade permits had uniformly been issued for all 
other groups by the city clerk on the request of the traffic bureau of the 
police department, which was under Commissioner Connor's direc-
tion. The requirement that the approval of the full Commission be 
obtained was applied only to this one group."51 Nevertheless, Connor 
"had made clear" his incapacity to act; note the success-verb construc-
tion, which carries with it the twin implications that what Connor said 
was true, and that - because he had made it clear - the demonstra-
tors were on notice of its truth. 
The Court then turns to its legal arguments. First, it insists that 
48. 388 U.S. at 315, 318. 
49. 388 U.S. at 317 n.9 (emphasis in original). 
50. 388 U.S. at 317-18. 
51. 388 U.S. at 326 (Warren, C.J., dissenting); see also A. WESTIN & B. MAHONEY, supra 
note 25, at 105-06, 121 (detailing the petitioners' arguments presented at trial). 
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although the Birmingham statute and the ex parte injunction both 
raise "substantial constitutional issues," neither "was transparently in-
valid or had only a frivolous pretense to validity."52 This is because 
"the free passage of traffic and the prevention of public disorder and 
violence become important objects of legitimate state concern,"53 and 
(as we have seen) problems of traffic and disorder actually arose dur-
ing the Birmingham demonstrations. 
Because the statute and injunction were not transparently invalid, 
the Court argues, the demonstrators should have proceeded immedi-
ately to court to test them. 
There was an interim of two days between the issuance of the injunction 
and the Good Friday march. The petitioners give absolutely no explana-
tion of why they did not make some application to the state court during 
that period .... It cannot be presumed that the Alabama courts would 
have ignored the petitioners' constitutional claims. 54 
For, and this is both the Court's ultimate argument and final 
paragraph, 
in the fair administration of justice no man can be judge in his own case, 
however exalted his station, however righteous his motives, and irrespec-
tive of his race, color, politics, or religion. This Court cannot hold that 
the petitioners were constitutionally free to ignore all the procedures of 
the law and carry their battle to the streets. One may sympathize with 
the petitioners' impatient commitment to their cause. But respect for 
judicial process is a small price to pay for the civilizing hand of law, 
which alone can give abiding meaning to constitutional freedom. 55 
Here the Court echoes Felix Frankfurter's concurring opinion in 
United Mine Workers: 
Only when a court is so obviously traveling outside its orbit as to be 
merely usurping judicial forms and facilities, may an order issued by a 
court be disobeyed and treated as though it were a letter to a newspaper. 
Short of an indisputable want of authority on the part of a court, the 
very existence of a court presupposes its power to entertain a contro-
versy, if only to decide, after deliberation, that it has no power over the 
particular controversy. Whether a defendant may be brought to the bar 
of justice is not for the defendant himself to decide. 
52. 388 U.S. at 315, 316. 
53. 388 U.S. at 316. 
54. 388 U.S. at 318-19. In fact, the petitioners did not have two days since the injunction 
was not served until the day before the scheduled demonstration. (Though they knew all day 
Wednesday that Connor was preparing to obtain an injunction. T. BRANCH, supra note 24, at 
727.) Norman Amaker, one of the movement's lawyers, recollects "that there was never any 
serious discussion of counseling the leaders to go into court to seek relief prior to the Good 
Friday march. Going into court would have required foregoing the weekend marches .... " A. 
WESTIN & B. MAHONEY, supra note 25, at 80. 
55. 388 U.S. at 320-21 (footnote omitted). 
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... There can be no free society without law administered through an 
independent judiciary. If one man can be allowed to determine for him-
self what is law, every man can. That means first chaos, then tyranny.56 
There was a certain irony in Frankfurter's statement, an irony that 
moves us from the local history of the Birmingham events recounted 
in Walker to the political history encapsulated in the Mine Workers 
rule. Howat, 57 the Court's principal precedent in Walker, was a labor 
injunction case (as was United Mine Workers itself), and it is clear 
from Walker's reliance on Howat that the Court's political history as-
similates Judge Jenkins' injunction against the Birmingham march to 
past uses of injunctions in labor disputes. 
The labor injunction was a tool of union busting in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries. The parallels with Project C are 
clear: labor unions, like the civil rights demonstrators, sought to 
launch coordinated demonstrations and actions against their employ-
ers. Like Bull Connor, the employers would tum to sympathetic 
judges in order to enjoin these demonstrations and thereby to defuse 
the movement. The classic study of the labor injunction, launching a 
devastating attack on it, was co-authored by none other than Frank-
furter. 58 Though the Walker majority fails to mention the fact, Chief 
Justice Warren's dissenting opinion alludes to the unsavory political 
history encoded in Howat and United Mine Workers (and cites Frank-
furter's book).59 It is a political history of judicial power pressed or 
manipulated into service by entrenched interests in order to stifle so-
cial change. And indeed, it is a political history to which Walker sub-
sequently contributed: in the year following the decision, at least fifty-
four injunctions were employed by university administrators against 
the student movement, and - in another ironic historical twist -
Walker was used to buttress labor injunctions in sectors not covered 
by the federal anti-injunction laws that Frankfurter had been instru-
mental in creating. 60 Walker's political narrative conceals and extends 
a secret history of judicial authority ("secret," of course, because the 
Court elects to leave unmentioned the history of the use of injunctions 
56. United States v. United Mineworkers, 330 U.S. 258, 309-10, 312 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring). 
57. Howat v. Kansas, 258 U.S. 181 (1922). 
58. F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930). Later, the injunc-
tion device would be pressed into service by opponents of the Progressive movement in order to 
prevent the enforcement of Progressive legislation. See O. Flss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 
1-4 (1978). 
59. Walker, 388 U.S. at 330-31 (Warren, C.J., dissenting). 
60. A. WESTIN & B. MAHONEY, supra note 25, at 277-78. The statistic on university injunc-
tions is from Note, Equity on the Campus: The Limits of Injunctive Regulation of University 
Protest, 80 YALE L.J. 987, 987 (1971). 
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registered in Howat).61 It is that history that we must now explore. 
B. The Republic of Laws and "Transparent Invalidity,, 
The rhetorical structure of the Court's opinion suggests that it is 
making something like the following argument: 
(1) The city officials' concerns about traffic and rowdiness were 
born out in fact, and so, a fortiori, they were reasonable concerns. 
(2) Because their concerns were reasonable, the injunction (and 
the statute upon which it was based), though arguably unconstitu-
tional, was not transparently unconstitutional (the court was not, in 
Frankfurter's words, "obviously traveling outside its orbit"). 
(3) Had the injunction been transparently unconstitutional, the 
demonstrators would perhaps have been within their rights to disobey. 
(4) However, on the assumption that its unconstitutionality was 
debatable, the only legitimate course for the demonstrators to follow 
was to test it in court. 
(5) The rule of law instructing them to this effect was clear, and 
they were on notice of it. 
(6) Since the demonstrators did not attempt to test the injunction's 
constitutionality in court, they can be punished for disobeying it. 
Even the various dissenters appear to accept the validity of this 
argument, disagreeing not with its jurisprudence but with steps (2) or 
(5). Thus, Chief Justice Warren believes that the statute "is patently 
unconstitutional on its face,"62 Justice Douglas agrees that it is "un-
constitutional on its face or patently unconstitutional as applied,"63 
and Justice Brennan, though he insists that his opinion does not deal 
with the merits of the constitutional claim, accepts the contention 
"that the ordinance and injunction are in fact facially unconstitu-
tional. "64 Similarly, the various dissenters contest the applicability of 
Howat, though to different extents. Warren believes that it was weak-
61. Another political narrative the Walker Court buries by exercising its victor's prerogative 
of assigning the meaning it chooses to past events lies in its use of previous Court opinions. The 
Court describes the Howat rule, 258 U.S. at 189-90, quoted supra text accompanying note 46, as 
"consistent with the rule of law followed by the federal courts," and cites a string of cases in 
support of this claim. Walker, 388 U.S. at 314 & n.5. But in fact two of the cases cited - Ex 
parte Rowland, 104 U.S. 604 (1881), and In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887) - stand for precisely 
the opposite proposition. Howat requires obedience to invalid orders on pain of contempt, 
whereas Rowland and Ayers, like the related cases In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200 (1888), and Ex 
parte Fisk, 113 U.S. 713 (1885), hold that disobedience of an invalid court order cannot be pun· 
ished as contempt. (For clear statements of this holding, see Fisk, 113 U.S. at 718, and Rowland, 
104 U.S. at 612.) 
62. Walker, 388 U.S. at 328 (Warren, C.J., dissenting). 
63. 388 U.S. at 338 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
64. 388 U.S. at 342 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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ened by subsequent decisions, 65 Douglas stresses that its rule makes an 
exception when " 'the question of jurisdiction' is 'frivolous and not 
substantial' " 66 hence, when the ordinance is "unconstitutional on its 
face or patently unconstitutional as applied"; and Brennan accepts 
Howat as a "premise," arguing that the interest it underwrites can be 
outweighed. 67 
Clearly, however, the heart of the Court's treatise on civil obedi-
ence lies in the jurisprudential premise of its argument, with which 
even the dissenters appear to agree. I repeat it for emphasis: (3) Had 
the injunction been transparently unconstitutional the demonstrators 
would perhaps have been within their rights to disobey. (4) However, on 
the assumption that its unconstitutionality was debatable, the only legit-
imate course for the demonstrators to follow was to test its constitution-
ality in court. 
Now the Court never actually says that if the injunction's unconsti-
tutionality had been transparent the demonstrators would have been 
free to disobey it; as we shall see the Court's rhetorical stance did not 
permit it to say such a thing. But Stewart devotes almost a third of his 
opinion to demonstrating that the statute and injunction were not 
"transparently invalid," none of which would be relevant unless trans-
parent invalidity might affect the outcome of the case. 
This is a point worth emphasizing, because it points to a remarka-
ble incoherence in the opinion (as well as Frankfurter's Mine Workers 
concurrence). Remember that the Court's decisive argument rests on 
the familiar maxim that no one can be a judge in his own case. The 
statute and injunction may have been unconstitutional, but that is for 
a court to decide, not for the demonstrators to judge on their own. 
If this argument holds at all, it holds regardless of whether the 
statute and injunction were "transparently invalid." For even then, if 
it is left to the demonstrators to determine transparent invalidity, they 
are acting as judges in their own case. Since the Court will not permit 
anyone to be judge in his own case, the Court had no need to insist 
that the statute and injunction were not transparently invalid; it had 
no need to recite a set of facts designed to underscore that the statute 
and injunction were not transparently invalid. In fact, it had no need 
for most of its opinion. 
The opinion is a remarkable instance of protesting too much. The 
65. 388 U.S. at 332 & n.9 (Warren, C.J., dissenting) (citing In re Green, 369 U.S. 689 
(1962)). 
66. 388 U.S. at 337 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. United Mine Workers, 
330 U.S. 258, 293 (1947)). 
67. 388 U.S. at 343-44 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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Court's fervent desire to prove a point (that the statute and injunction 
were not transparently invalid), even though the Court's argument 
renders that point irrelevant, points to an abiding and deeply buried 
anxiety - a kind of Banquo's ghost - that the Court dared not ac-
knowledge but that it could not help addressing. 
The anxiety arises from the political narratives that give meaning 
to American constitutionalism. The very notion of the rule of law and 
not of men, which goes back as far as Plato, 68 implies a limit to what 
authority can do, and thus contains within it the concept of ultra vires 
action. Moreover, the theory of popular sovereignty says that when 
governmental authority runs out the actual exercise of sovereignty de-
volves back to the people. 69 Finally, the idea that law must be public, 
and publicly comprehensible, implies that there must be some point at 
which ordinary citizens can know that an action is ultra vires and thus 
that the power to disobey has devolved upon them. That is the point 
of transparent unconstitutionality to which the Court refers. The con-
cept of transparent unconstitutionality, and the right to disobey trans-
parently unconstitutional injunctions, is thus a linchpin of the 
legitimacy of American government: take it away and you must aban-
don the rule of law, or popular sovereignty, or the publicity of law. 
The Court cannot quite bring itself to acknowledge this point, 
however, for a very good reason: an open acknowledgment that we 
are entitled to disobey transparently unconstitutional injunctions 
would invite us to judge constitutionality for ourselves, thereby under-
mining the authority of the courts. Clearly it is this possibility that the 
Walker Court is most concerned to foreclose. The political narratives 
underlying the authority of American courts vest ultimate power -
including the ultimate power of understanding the law - not in the 
courts but in the citizenry, and insists that courts' authority is 
bounded. In Walker, however, the Court confronted the question of 
who is to determine the bounds of judicial authority. 
Now it may be that the logic of self-reference compels the Supreme 
Court to insist on its own ultimate authority to answer this question. 
After all, the Court cannot deny its authority to determine the bounds 
of judicial authority unless it possesses the very authority it is denying. 
The Court would become enmeshed in a form of the Liar Paradox, 
almost as though it had said, "Our own rulings about our authority, 
including this one, lack legitimacy." The Court can deny its jurisdic-
tion over many matters, but it cannot deny its jurisdiction over ques-
68. PLATO, LAWS *715d. But cf. PLATO, STATESMAN *294a-297b, for his doubts about the 
efficacy of the rule of law. 
69. Thus also the ninth and tenth amendments to the Constitution. 
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tions of its own jurisdiction, particularly since no higher court exists to 
which it can defer. 
But neither logic nor law compelled the Court to insist that Judge 
Jenkins possessed the authority to determine the bounds of his consti-
tutional authority. He was wrong about the constitutionality of his 
injunction and this was transparent to the demonstrators; they were 
willing to gamble that the Supreme Court would back their judgment 
by affirming the political narratives underlying American 
constitutionalism. 
To see why the Court nevertheless felt compelled to deny them the 
opportunity to take that gamble, recall Levinson's distinction between 
a "catholic" mode of interpretation, according to which the Church -
or here the Supreme Court70 -is the dispenser of ultimate interpreta-
tion, and a "protestant" mode, in which the individual, or at any rate 
the community, is the ultimate interpreter. It would be gravely peril-
ous for the Supreme Court to accept a "protestant" popular judgment 
that Judge Jenkins had exceeded the bounds of his constitutional au-
thority. That would highlight the uncomfortable fact that the 
Supreme Court too can exceed the bounds of its constitutional author-
ity, and to stress this would invite a protestant reformation reaching 
all the way to Rome. For although the logic of self-reference pre-
cludes the Court from denying its own authority to adjudicate its au-
thority, nothing precludes others from denying that authority, any 
more than the fact that on logical grounds I cannot say, "I am an 
inveterate liar" precludes others from saying that I am an inveterate 
liar. To put it another way, the fact that the Court must necessarily 
adopt the catholic mode of interpretation shows nothing more than 
that it is the Court; it is entitled to insist on the catholic mode of 
interpretation, however, only on the question-begging catholic as-
sumption that the choice is the Court's to make.71 Perhaps for this 
70. Both are meanings of the Latin curia. 
71. This is not to deny that eventually - at the subsequent contempt hearing - a court and 
not "the people" will decide whether "the people" were right in their judgment that the injunc-
tion was invalid, nor is it to deny that the validity or invalidity of the injunction will be deter-
mined by the court in the "catholic" manner, looking at prior cases as well as the constitutional 
text. Thus, had the Walker Court chosen to hold that one cannot be punished for violating an 
unconstitutional injunction, the courts would still retain the authority of adjudicating the injunc-
tion's constitutionality. The argument here indicates, however, that we may not be able to find a 
cogent reason to believe that the retention by the courts of this ultimate authority is consistent 
with the liberal and anti-authoritarian ("protestant") premises of American constitutionalism 
(the rule oflaw, popular sovereignty, the publicity of law). The Court itself has raised the possi-
bility that Congress ("the peoples' " virtual representative) retains interpretive authority. Kat· 
zenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (see especially the dissent of Harlan, J.). (This footnote 
was added as a result of a conversation with Peter Quint, to whom I am also indebted for the 
reference to Katzenbach.) 
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reason the Court clings desperately and tenaciously to the catholic 
mode "all the way down" to Judge Jenkins' court (a theological stance 
harkening back to institutionalized religion at its most authoritarian). 
And thus it must simultaneously invoke the right to disobey transpar-
ently unconstitutional injunctions and foreclose the possibility that cit-
izens might exercise independent judgment of the right's predicate. 
The Walker opinion fulfills this self-undermining twin need. In-
stead of the history of publicity, of popular sovereignty, and of limited 
official authority, the court's political narrative yokes the Constitution 
to the history of the labor injunction - of union busting. Its funda-
mental effect is to convert the notion of a transparently unconstitu-
tional injunction into a kind of half-chimerical ideal. It is not quite 
mythical, for we can imagine that even the Court would find transpar-
ently unconstitutional an injunction saying "It is hereby ordered that 
the Constitution of the United States of America is suspended. "72 But 
in Walker the Court comes close to saying that anything less extreme 
- anything that authority takes the slightest care to disguise, thereby 
presenting a litigiable issue - is not transparently unconstitutional. 
After all, in Walker we are confronted with an injunction that 
could hardly have been more irregular: it was issued ex parte, with 
less than a day available for appeal, at the behest of commissioners 
who had lost their mandate. 73 It would irreparably damage the dem-
onstrators - a standard legal reason for not granting an injunction -
by causing their moment to pass, 74 and it was based on an extraordina-
rily broadly worded statute granting the commissioners virtually un-
fettered power of prior restraint, inasmuch as mere "convenience" was 
72. Nor is this a wholly fictitious scenario: Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), an opinion 
that every Justice signed individually for emphasis, was provoked by Arkansas Governor Orville 
Faubus' declaration that the Supreme Court's Brown decision was not binding. 
73. In other cases the Court recognized the validity of the first two of these reasons: in 
Carroll v. President & Commissioners of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968), the Court backed 
off from Walker by insisting that injunctions restraining the exercise of first amendment rights 
cannot be issued ex parte unless it is impossible to notify the opposing parties in time to allow 
them to be heard; and in Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. SI (1965), the Court had recognized 
that a speedy hearing and appeal are constitutionally required in a different first amendment 
context, namely censorship proceedings against a movie. 
74. For three reasons: first, demonstrators gathered from around the country cannot tarry 
indefinitely in Birmingham while waiting for the courts to rule on the injunction's validity; sec-
ond, the religious symbolism of holding the demonstrations on Good Friday and Easter Sunday 
was important, and those days come but once a year; third, the demonstrations were intended to 
target downtown businesses during the extra-busy Easter shopping season, and that season is 
relatively short. See A. WESTIN & B. MAHONEY, supra note 25, at 76. Moreover, the Court 
itself later recognized that when complying with a court order would do irreparable damage 
because it would subsequently be impossible to "unring the bell," one could defy the order with-
out facing conviction for contempt ifthe order was invalid. Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 460 
(1975). 
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included as a ground for denying parade permits.75 Nevertheless, the 
Court insists (what the dissenters deny) that this injunction is not 
transparently invalid. 
The message could hardly be made more plain: provided that au-
thority exerts the slightest effort to trick out its injunction in the trap-
pings of legality, the injunction is not transparently unconstitutional 
and the citizen's power to defy it with impunity evaporates. Walker 
virtually issues instructions to judges and other officials about how to 
insulate an injunction from the possibility of being legitimately dis-
obeyed. On the assumption that judges and other officials will follow 
these instructions in the future, the Court thus simultaneously presup-
poses and denies the jurisprudential premise of constitutionalism -
that a citizen may disobey a transparently invalid injunction. 
I will borrow some suggestive terminology from Jacques Derrida, 
and describe the notion that citizens may legitimately disobey a trans-
parently invalid injunction as a "dangerous supplement" to the 
Court's actual argument: though the argument presupposes that citi-
zens may legitimately disobey a transparently invalid injunction, this 
presupposition must remain unstated, for its acknowledgment within 
the argument would undermine the argument's claims to authority (by 
undermining the Court's rhetorical strategy of taking only authority's 
word seriously).76 The "dangerous supplement" props the argument 
up but cannot actually appear within it. 
C. The Naked Assertion of Judicial Authority 
I have spoken only of the transparent invalidity of Judge Jenkins' 
injunction, not of the underlying statute, though the Court and dis-
senters discuss both. That is because the Walker opinion really con-
cerns only the former, and indeed a key legal issue revolves around its 
asymmetrical treatment of injunctions and statutes, hence of judges 
and legislatures. 
75. Indeed, in Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969), the Court found 
this ordinance to be unconstitutional. Oddly enough, this opinion too was authored by Justice 
Stewart, who noted that the ordinance conferred on the City Commission "virtually unbridled 
and absolute power to prohibit any 'parade,' 'procession,' or 'demonstration' on the city's streets 
or public ways," so that it "fell squarely within the ambit of the many decisions of this Court 
over the last 30 years, holding that a law subjecting the exercise of First Amendment freedoms to 
the prior restraint of a license, without narrow, objective, and definite standards to guide the 
licensing authority, is unconstitutional." Strikingly, Stewart cited numerous decisions that "have 
made clear that a person faced with such an unconstitutional licensing law may ignore it and 
engage with impunity in the exercise of the right offree expression for which the law purports to 
require a license." Shuttlesworth, 394 U.S. at 150-51 (footnotes omitted). 
76. J. DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY 144-64 (G. Spivak trans. 1976); J. DERRIDA, Plato's 
Pharkmakon, in DISSEMINATION 156-71 (B. Johnson trans. 1981). 
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As Chief Justice Warren emphasizes in his dissent, one cannot be 
punished for violating an unconstitutional statute, and indeed it may 
be impossible to gain standing to test the statute in court unless one 
disobeys it.77 Yet the Walker decision holds that the demonstrators 
can be punished for contempt when they violate an unconstitutional 
injunction. Evidently the authority of courts matters in a way that the 
authority of legislatures does not. Why? 
The answer cannot be because of any constitutional superiority of 
the judicial process over the legislative process. For the issue in 
Walker is whether the petitioners can test an unconstitutional court 
order by disobeying it; the unconstitutionality of the order is one of 
the givens of the problem, and the difference in the processes by which 
an unconstitutional order issues therefore drops out of consideration. 
Unconstitutionality is unconstitutionality. The Court treats court or-
ders as different in kind from legislative enactments, whereas the judi-
cial and legislative processes differ only in degree (of accuracy, 
responsiveness, law-abidingness, whatever). 
Indeed, what is most apparent in Walker is the Court's anxiety to 
uphold judicial authority as such, as though it were civilization's final, 
frail barrier against a lurking catastrophe.78 Hence the Court's final 
sentence: "But respect for judicial process is a small price to pay for 
the civilizing hand of law, which alone can give abiding meaning to 
constitutional freedom."79 Ifl am right, the Supreme Court wanted to 
preclude the very possibility of testing the validity of injunctions by 
disobeying them because it viewed injunctions as utterly different in 
kind from statutes, as final barriers against civil anarchy. Frankfurter 
says this explicitly in the passage we quoted above: "the very exist-
ence of a court" - hence, its existence as such, regardless of its legiti-
macy - "presupposes its power to entertain a controversy . . . . There 
can be no free society without law administered through an indepen-
dent judiciary. If one man can be allowed to determine for himself 
what is law, every man can. That means first chaos, then tyranny."80 
A restraining order is a last ditch attempt to stop something from hap-
pening, to pull the plug on an impending event, and the Court appar-
77. Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 327 (1967) (Warren, C.J., dissenting). 
78. Similar concerns emerge in cases about judicial tort immunity. The most notable is 
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978), in which the Court found that a trial judge who had 
ordered a teenager sterilized at the ex parte request of the teenager's mother was immune from 
tort liability. Indeed, it is only in the most bizarre of circumstances that judicial immunity dis-
solves. See, e.g., Zarcone v. Perry, 572 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1978) (upholding punitive damages 
against a traffic judge who had ordered a street vendor brought into his courtroom in manacles 
because he had sold the judge a bad cup of coffee). 
79. Walker, 388 U.S. at 321. 
80. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 310, 312 (1947). 
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ently believed that there must be some device that enables the 
authorities to pull the plug on an impending event. 
This, I am convinced, is the heart of the Walker decision. The 
Court saw itself confronting a challenge to the judiciary's ultimate au-
thority, the authority to stop events from getting out of hand; the 
Court was willing to go to almost any length in order to uphold that 
authority. As we have seen, ample grounds existed for the Court to 
find for the petitioners in a decision narrowly tailored to the facts: the 
ex parte hearing, its timing, the fact that Bull Connor had been voted 
out of office, his treatment of Mrs. Hendricks, his history of racism 
(known to the Court from prior cases),81 not to mention the well-
known commitment of the SCLC to nonviolence. Each could have 
provided a convenient hook for a favorable decision. 82 The fact that 
the Court did not rest content with allowing even a narrow exception 
to the inviolability of court orders shows that it feared even the slight-
est diminution of judicial ability to stop events. 
This is particularly striking in view of the Supreme Court's general 
support for the civil rights movement and civil rights demonstrations 
in the years preceding Walker. 83 In hindsight, Walker (together with 
the Adderley decision handed down seven months before84) in fact 
marks a turning point in the Court's attitude, away from the civil 
rights movement and in the direction of greater emphasis on civil or-
der. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan lets us know why: 
"We cannot permit fears of 'riots' and 'civil disobedience' generated by 
slogans like 'Black Power' to divert our attention from what is here at 
stake .... "85 Walker was decided in 1966, when the nonviolent civil 
rights movement was metamorphosing into greater militance and the 
country had witnessed riots in Watts and Harlem spread elsewhere; by 
1966, the slogan "Burn, baby, burn!" had raised the fear of self-fueling 
riots. The Court saw itself confronting a very real possibility of losing 
its grip.86 
81. In his dissent, Chief Justice Warren cites five cases and two governmental reports that 
take official notice of "[t]he attitude of the city administration in general and of its Public Safety 
Commissioner in particular .... " Walker. 388 U.S. at 325 n.l (Warren, C.J., dissenting). 
82. Westin and Mahoney argue that the Court should have found in favor of King in an 
opinion narrowly tailored to the exceptional facts. A. WESTIN & B. MAHONEY, supra note 25, at 
286-89. 
83. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965) (protecting demonstrators from state 
suppression); Fields v. South Carolina, 375 U.S. 44 (1963) (same); Edwards v. South Carolina, 
372 U.S. 229 (1963) (same). 
84. Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) was the first Supreme Court case in the 1960s 
upholding the convictions of nonviolent demonstrators. A. WESTIN & B. MAHONEY, supra note 
25, at 205. 
85. Walker, 388 U.S. at 349 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
86. This is a major theme in A. WESTIN & B. MAHONEY, supra note 25. 
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This perhaps makes the Court's response more comprehensible; it 
does nothing to render it justifiable. The entire question of the legiti-
macy of judicial authority remains begged, and begged to its depths. 
Authority "needs" to be able to stop social protest from getting out of 
hand. It "needs" to be able to freeze the status quo in emergency 
situations, even by unconstitutional means. Why is that? To be sure, 
violence is an intrinsically terrible thing; but the Supreme Court of the 
United States did not base the "need" to stop matters from getting out 
of hand on grounds of pacifism, for the United States government is in 
no respect pacifist. 87 The status quo is itself always maintained by 
violence, and never more so than in the case of Jim Crow.88 The ulti-
mate question remains: Why should courts be able legitimately to re-
serve the power to preserve an unjust status quo of which they are a 
part, even for a single second, by means that exceed their authority?89 
(This, too, after all, is an example of being a judge in one's own case.) 
87. An important case prefiguring Walker that runs contrary to my general line of argument 
here is United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563 (1906). In that case, the Supreme Court issued an 
order preventing the execution of Johnson, a black man convicted of raping a white woman, 
pending appeal. A lynch-mob gathered at the jail and Shipp, the sheriff guarding the prisoner, 
joined forces with the mob to carry out the lynching. Shipp was convicted of contempt of court. 
He argued that the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction for its order, and therefore that he could 
not be punished for contemning it. The Court rejected this argument in a discussion that links 
the necessity of preventing violence with the question-begging assertion of the Court's "catholic" 
authority to determine the limits of its own authority: "Until its judgment declining jurisdiction 
should be announced, it [le., the Supreme Court] had authority from the necessity of the case to 
make orders to preserve the existing conditions and the subject of the petition .... " Shipp, 203 
U.S. at 573. 
Shipp appears to illustrate the necessity of some social mechanism to "pull the plug" on 
events that threaten to get out of hand, leading to incidents as appalling as the lynching of 
Johnson. But why should it be judicial authority? Why not the sheriff? In Shipp, of course, the 
answer is that the sheriff was part of the mob. But must it therefore be a judge? We can imagine 
judges who also fail to do their job for the same reasons as the sheriff; we could imagine the 
Supreme Court, or any other authority, failing to do its job for racist reasons. The argument 
from the need for a social mechanism to freeze events in their tracks to the vindication of judicial 
authority is thus a complete non sequitur. To see this clearly, consider a case cognate to Shipp: 
Johnson is unjustly convicted, and the unjust conviction is upheld by the Supreme Court. Now 
events are threatening to get out of hand: Johnson is about to be executed. What is needed, 
clearly, is some social mechanism to "pull the plug" on these events. Since all the authorities are 
united in their determination to execute Johnson unjustly, the task falls to a mob of Johnson's 
supporters, who rescue him dramatically from jail. Here the need for a social mechanism to 
freeze events in their tracks, in order to stop unjust violence, vindicates mob rebellion against 
judicial authority, just as in Shipp it vindicates judicial authority itself. 
88. The history of violence employed to maintain Jim Crow goes all the way back to the 
dissolution of Reconstruction. See, e.g., United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875) (deny-
ing federal authority to punish private individuals for forcibly breaking up a black political meet-
ing and thereby hindering the exercise by blacks of the right to vote). For an eloquent reminder 
that law rests on violence, see Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986). 
89. In his Letter, King writes: "I have almost reached the regrettable conclusion that the 
Negro's great stumbling block in his stride toward freedom is not the White Citizen's Counciler 
or Ku Klux Klanner, but the white moderate, who is more devoted to 'order' than to justice 
.... " KING, Letter, supra note 13, at 87. The debate over whether the highest legal value is 
order or justice is an old one; I have sketched arguments about this issue in ancient Greek litera-
ture, and argued that the pursuit of order at the expense of justice is faulty. See Luban, Some 
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To freeze the status quo inevitably does more than delay social 
protest. It destroys it. Social protest is always a miraculous phenome-
non; it is irrational for an individual to participate in collective action 
for social change even when the collective action is itself rational; 
whether or not the action occurs will never tum on the participation of 
a single individual, so for each individual it makes more sense to leave 
the risks and labor to others than to participate.90 Since this is true for 
all individuals, social protest is almost always stillborn, suffocated by 
cords of inertia, mistrust, and self-interest. Moreover, because mem-
bers of victimized groups typically live in environments with little eco-
nomic security, it may be more rational for them to emphasize the 
short run over the long, and thus consent to a substantial level of op-
pression that nevertheless offers a livelihood, rather than choosing the 
risky path of seeking structural change.91 
Social protest can occur only when individuals are stirred in their 
souls, stirred to act in a way that is not individually rational. For 
years, or decades, even centuries, the routine of oppression proceeds 
uninterrupted. Then, inexplicably, at certain privileged moments the 
curtain lifts and political action flames into existence. At a rally in 
Manila, or a shipyard strike in Gdansk, or a public funeral in Beijing, 
or a segregated bus in Montgomery, something unpredictable happens 
to interrupt the timid calculations of individual rationality. In Benja-
min's words, 
Where thinking suddenly stops in a configuration pregnant with, ten-
sions, it gives that configuration a shock, by which it crystallizes into a 
monad .... In this structure [the historical materialist] recognizes the 
sign of a Messianic cessation of happening . . . . He takes cognizance of 
it in order to blast a specific era out of the homogeneous course of his-
Greek Trials: Order and Justice in Homer, Hesiod, Aeschylus, and Plato. 54 TENN. L. REV. 279 
(1987) .. 
90. This argument was explored initially in M. OlSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE AC-
TION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (rev. ed. 1971). See also R. HARDIN, 
COLLECTIVE ACTION (1982). This argument is applied to the analysis of revolutionary social 
change in Buchanan, Revolutionary Motivation and Rationality, 9 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 59 (1979). 
But see G. KAVKA, HOBBESIAN MORAL AND POLITICAL THEORY 266-79 (1986), for an argu-
ment that revolutionary participation can be rational. On the relationship between collective 
action problems and the legal system, see D. LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL 
STUDY 364-91 (1988). 
91. See J. COHEN & J. ROGERS, RULES OF THE GAME: AMERICAN POLITICS AND THE 
CENTRAL AMERICA MOVEMENT (1986) (a succinct statement of the obstacles facing social pro-
test movements in America); J. COHEN & J. ROGERS, ON DEMOCRACY: TOWARD A TRANSFOR· 
MATION OF AMERICAN SOCIETY 47-87 (1983); Przeworski, Proletariat into a Class: The Process 
of Class Formation from Karl Kautsky's The Class Struggle to Recent Controversies, 7 POL. & 
SocY. 343 (1977); Przeworski, Material Bases of Consent: Economics and Politics in a Hege-
monic System, 1 POL. POWER & Soc. THEORY 21 (1980); Przeworski, Social Democracy as a 
Historical Phenomenon, NEW LEFT REV., July-Aug. 1980, at 27; Przeworski & Wallerstein, The 
Structure of Class Conflict in Democratic Capitalist Societies, 76 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 215 (1982). 
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tory .... 92 
But if that moment - "shot through," as Benjamin says, "with chips 
of Messianic time"93 passes, if the momentum of social protest is in-
terrupted, the miracle will no longer occur. The protestors lose their 
faith, or they must return to their families and jobs, or the media go 
home, or the instant of dialectical sympathy between the protestors 
and the larger community, which would draw the larger community 
into the movement, evaporates. Wyatt Walker recollected: "One op-
tion we eliminated was going to court to try to get the injunction dis-
solved. We knew this would tie us up in court at least ten days to two 
weeks, and even then we might not get it dissolved. We would have a 
lengthy lawsuit to appeal but no Birmingham campaign. All of our 
planning and organizing, a year's effort, would have been in vain, and 
that was exactly what the city was trying to accomplish by going to 
court."94 Bull Connor and Judge Jenkins understood that for a pro-
test movement delay means death. Authority always understands that 
for a protest movement, delay means death. The Supreme Court of 
the United States understood it. In the Walker decision, the Court 
imposed, so far as it was able, a death sentence on social protest. By 
what right did the Court cast its vote for existent injustice over social 
change? Why is a court's claim to authority greater than that of the 
civil rights movement? 
One answer, of course, is that judges are democratically elected or 
chosen by democratically elected representatives. But this is scarcely 
a decisive argument, for two reasons: . first, in many cases (and notably 
the case of blacks in the South of 1963) the protest movement has had 
no part in the democratic process (and the process is itself stacked 
against oppressed people); and second, the question turns on unconsti-
tutional injunctions issued by democratically elected judges. 
Ultimately, the Walker Court reserved for the judiciary the au-
thority to stifle social protest by any means, constitutional or not. Its 
assertion of authority is naked, unsupported by anything other than 
the assertion itself. 
And, to underscore the argument of the preceding section, let me 
repeat that the assertion is an incoherent one, undercutting the prem-
ises of liberal democracy - the narrative of American political history 
- on which judicial authority ostensibly rests: by granting courts the 
right to exceed the limits of their own authority, the Court must aban-
don the notion of the rule of law, or popular sovereignty, or publicity. 
92. W. BENJAMIN, supra note 2, at 264-65. 
93. Id. at 265. 
94. Quoted in A. WESTIN & B. MAHONEY, supra note 25, at 76. 
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It may be objected that I have misread the Walker Court's empha-
sis: its main focus is not the vexed issue of transparent unconstitution-
ality. Rather, the Court's point is a simpler and less controversial one, 
namely that the demonstrators wrongly made no effort to get the in-
junction dissolved even though they had enough time to attempt to do 
so. After all, the Walker Court writes that "[t]his case would arise in 
quite a different constitutional posture if the petitioners, before dis-
obeying the injunction, had challenged it in the Alabama courts, and 
had been met with delay or frustration of their constitutional 
claims."95 This suggests that had the demonstrators challenged the 
injunction, Walker might have been decided differently. That, at any 
rate, is how the Court subsequently understood Walker. 96 This latter 
reading of the case implies that the Walker Court was not concerned, 
as I have been arguing, to make it as difficult as possible for demon-
strators to disobey injunctions, even unconstitutional injunctions; 
rather, the Court was concerned merely to ensure that before dis-
obeying the injunction the demonstrators must first exhaust judicial 
remedies. 
Now I do not wish to deny that this is a possible reading of Walker 
even though it ignores the third of the opinion devoted to proving that 
the injunction was not transparently invalid; but it is a superficial 
reading, for the seemingly minimal, seemingly reasonable request to 
seek dissolution of an unconstitutional court order before violating it is 
itself offensive or even immoral unless the larger questions we have 
been considering about the legitimacy of judicial authority can be 
answered. 
This may be seen clearly if we reflect on hypothetical cases in 
which a local court issues a degrading, debasing, and transparently 
unconstitutional order to a group. Part of the humiliation such an 
order inflicts on its recipients lies precisely in the need to go to another 
court to obtain authorization to disobey; the lower court humiliates 
the recipients by compelling them to offer gestures of respect and obei-
sance to the judicial system. Suppose, for example, that a Jewish 
group wishes to stage a protest march and is ordered by a judge to 
wear yellow Star of David armbands, ostensibly for the purpose of 
95. Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 318 (1967). 
96. See United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 532 n.4 (1971) ("Our holding [in Walker] that 
the claims there sought to be asserted were not open on review of petitioners' contempt convic-
tions was based upon the availability of review of those claims at an earlier stage."); see also 
Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408, 414 (1964); Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449 (1975). 
The lesson of these cases, according to Wright, is that "the validity of an order can be challenged 
in a contempt proceeding for violation of the order only if there was no opportunity for effective 
review of the order before it was violated." c. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 88 (4th ed. 
1983). 
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identification to help police keep the traffic orderly. Much of the of-
fensiveness of the order lies precisely in making the group go through 
a charade of deference - by seeking to dissolve an order that is so 
obviously unconstitutional, and so obviously intended as a mere racial 
harassment - before violating it. Nor is the example much more out-
rageous than the actual Birmingham injunction, which issued under 
circumstances in which it could hardly have been clearer that it was a 
mere racial harassment. 
Another hypothetical example will illustrate the point. Suppose 
that the Birmingham Ku Klux Klan had publicly issued its own mock 
"injunction" to prevent the Project C march, announcing, however, 
that it would be willing to "dissolve" its "injunction" provided that 
the demonstrators publicly applied to the Imperial Wizard in writing. 
Here it is obvious that the Klan's offer to "dissolve" the mock "injunc-
tion" heightens, rather than diminishes, the outrageousness of the "in-
junction" itself. And it is also obvious that this is because the Klan 
has no authority to issue such morally debasing commands in the first 
place. 
The only difference between this and the Walker Court's insistence 
that the demonstrators apply to a court to dissolve Judge Jenkins' un-
constitutional injunction before disobeying it must lie in the fact that 
the court system has the authority that the Klan so obviously lacks. 
And thus, to explain why the demonstrators should not simply ad-
judge Judge Jenkins' order transparently unconstitutional and disobey 
(intending to accept their punishment if their judgment was wrong), 
we need to explain why Judge Jenkins had the authority to compel 
them to jump through additional judicial hoops merely by issuing an 
unconstitutional order. The seemingly minimal, seemingly reasonable 
request to seek dissolution of the injunction before disobeying it is 
neither minimal nor reasonable unless it can be grounded in an ac-
count of why judicial authority to issue unconstitutional injunctions 
deserves respect in the first place. 97 
Thus, the Court cannot evade the deeper questions of judicial au-
thority, and its "dangerous supplement," that we have been exploring. 
To conclude our examination of Walker, let us see how, finally, the 
Court answers them. 
97. Not only is the bare fact of acceding to a racially harassing order in and of itself an injury 
to the demonstrators, it is also likely to destroy their effectiveness by undermining their confi-
dence in their own leaders' commitment and courage. Thus, even on the Maness v. Meyers "un-
ring the bell" test, see supra note 74, the request to seek dissolution of the injunction before 
disobeying it is far from minimal. 
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D. "The Civilizing Hand of Law, Which Alone Can Give ... ,, 
"But respect for judicial process is a small price to pay for 
the civilizing hand of law, which alone can give abiding mean-
ing to constitutional freedom. "98 
This, the Court's final sentence, contains an ironic grammatical 
ambiguity introduced by its most important word: "alone." It can be 
read as the assertion that the civilizing hand of law is necessary to give 
abiding meaning to constitutional freedom - rather clearly what the 
Court intended - or that the civilizing hand of law is sufficient to give 
abiding meaning to constitutional freedom. 
Double meanings like this - Freud called them "parapraxes" -
are almost enough to make one believe in psychoanalysis. The Court 
probably did not intend to say that law can give abiding meaning to 
constitutional freedom all by itself: but in addition to being a gram-
matical reading of the sentence, it is a conclusion to which the Court is 
inevitably driven by the logic of its own argument. For if the civilizing 
hand of the law - judicial and governmental process - is not suffi-
cient to give abiding meaning to constitutional freedom, the Court has 
no business insisting that long-suffering citizens defer their attempts at 
self-help. Government's claim to exclusive authority is grounded in 
part on its ability to do the job, to keep its promises. It is precisely the 
ability of government to fulfill the constitutional promise of equality 
that the civil rights movement doubted. As King wrote in the Letter: 
"For years now I have heard the word 'Wait!' It rings in the ear of 
every Negro with piercing familiarity. This 'Wait' has almost always 
meant 'Never.' "99 The Court must do more than warn that if judicial 
processes are bypassed anarchy might result (which is probably false 
and, in any event, beside the point, inasmuch as the demonstrators 
were willing to accept the punishment for contempt had the injunction 
ultimately been found valid, and were therefore scarcely attempting to 
bypass judicial processes). In addition, the Court must reassure us 
that King is wrong, that "the civilizing hand of law" is in and of itself 
sufficient to produce abiding freedom. 100 
98. Walker, 388 U.S. at 321. 
99. KING, Letter, supra note 13, at 83. 
100. This is the defining belief of "Legal Centralism," the almost-universally accepted dogma 
of legal professionals. Legal Centralism has been defined as "a picture in which state agencies 
(and their learning) occupy the center oflegal life and stand in a relation of 'hierarchic control' to 
other, lesser normative orderings such as the family, the corporation, the business network." 
Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms, in ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND THE WELFARE STATE 161 (Cap· 
pelletti ed. 1981) (footnotes deleted). See also Trubek & Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: 
Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States, 1974 Wis. L. 
REV. 1062, 1070-72. For an iJluminating recent discussion, see Gordon, Without the Law II 
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The problem, of course, is that this is untrue, even monstrously 
untrue. Without the will and willingness of the people it governs, 
courts and governmental authority more generally are helpless. Segre-
gation was a decisive case in point, for one hundred years of the "civi-
lizing hand of law" had yielded black people little beyond Jim 
Crow. 101 Alexander Bickel argues persuasively that the South might 
actually have resisted court-ordered integration successfully but for 
• 
southern officials' tactical blunders of loosing extreme brutality on 
black children in front of news cameras, which mobilized northern 
support for the civil rights struggle. 102 Had the southern leadership 
responded more coolly, the civilizing hand of law would have been 
helpless. Indeed, as late as 1969 President Nixon could still refer to 
those who wanted to see Brown v. Board of Education enforced as "ex-
tremists." 103 The fact that such a statement could pass as sane polit-
ical discourse testifies to the lack of progress in school integration even 
after sixteen years, and thus to the Court's thoroughgoing inability to 
"give abiding meaning to constitutional freedom" alone. And, as a 
more general point, the very idea that legal institutions by themselves 
- that is, regardless of extra-institutional social behavior - can guar-
antee freedom, or anything else for that matter, is false to the point of 
insanity. It attributes a kind of divine omnipotence to legal institu-
tions that nothing human possesses. 
Yet the Court's rhetoric in Walker could offer no escape from the 
closed circle of authority. We have seen that rhetorically the opinion's 
aim was not ultimately to decide a disputed question: it was to reserve 
for authority the only possible voice through which disputed questions 
can even be posed. Walker's narrative structure tars every unofficial 
voice as a "judge in its own case," and thereby silences that voice's 
claim to enunciate justice for itself. 
I suggested earlier that legal narratives gain their authority by im-
plicitly comprehending institutions in religious categories. The 
Walker Court, faced with the need to exclude the authoritativeness of 
unofficial voices, solved the problem by implicitly attributing to legal 
institutions a superhuman efficacy and disinterest that demands un-
conditional obedience and faith. Facing a choice between the anti-
authoritarian consequences of liberal constitutionalism and the over-
(Book Review), 24 OSGOODE HALL L. REV. 421 (1986). Cover, supra note l, offers a telling 
critique of Legal Centralism. 
101. See generally R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1976). 
102. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 266-68 (1962). 
103. This was Nixon's response to the oral argument of Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of 
Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969), the decision ending "all deliberate speed" and ordering immediate 
school desegregation in Mississippi. J. BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES 314 (1981). 
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whelming desire to maintain reverence for authority, the Walker 
Court opted for the latter, staking out an extravagant claim on behalf 
of the legal system that only a supernatural power could fulfill and 
demanding allegiance that only a supernatural power deserves. Un-
able to tolerate the consequences of a merely secular liberalism, the 
Court chose to invest the legal system with an essentially religious 
authority. 
• In Sophocles' Antigone it is Creon who, like the Walker Court, is 
incapable of recognizing any claim to allegiance other than that ex-
erted by the state: "[H]e who counts another greater friend than his 
own fatherland, I put him nowhere."104 To which Creon's own son 
later responds: "You'd rule a desert beautifully alone." 105 Like 
Creon, the Walker Court was locked in the solipsism of an authority 
that recognizes only itself. Like Creon, the Walker Court, which 
failed even to mention the crucial social actors in Birmingham, put 
every social force other than the law itself "nowhere." Like Creon, 
the Walker Court would rule a desert beautifully alone. 106 
When the guard first tells Creon that someone has disobeyed his 
command (Antigone, like King, disobeyed the command in the name 
of honoring a higher religious law), he flies into a rage; he suspects 
everyone of inciting community-destroying civil war. The chorus 
comments: 
Many the wonders but nothing walks stranger than man. . . When he 
honors the laws of the land and the gods' sworn right high indeed is his 
city; but stateless the man who dares to dwell with dishonor. Not by my 
fire, never to share my thoughts, who does these things. 107 
It is the moment of supreme irony in the drama. We hear it 
through Creon's ears as a denunciation of Antigone; but as the action 
unfolds, we come gradually to realize that the chorus is referring to 
Creon himself, who has dishonored the gods' sworn right through his 
impious command, and who ends as a familyless exile from his own 
state, a prisoner of his own community-destroying autism. 108 
104. Sophocles, Antigone, in 2 THE COMPLETE GREEK TRAGEDIES 159, 165 II. 182-83 (E. 
Wyckoff trans. 1957). 
105. Id. at 184 I. 739. 
106. For a related thought about Walker, see R. BURT, Two JEWISH JUSTICES: OUTCASTS 
IN THE PROMISED LAND 103-13 (1988) (Walker commits error of"confounding the law and the 
judges"). 
107. Sophocles, supra note 104, at 170 1.335, 171 II. 369-72. 
108. Several readers of earlier drafts of this paper have asked me what rule I would propose 
in place of Walker's. Though answering this question - or even raising it - is quite tangential 
to my purposes in this essay, I believe that an answer is implicit in my analysis; this being the 
case, it might as well be made explicit. As we have seen, existing doctrine already permits a 
party to contemn a constitutionally infirm court order if it is issued ex parte despite the possibil-
ity of notifying the opposing party, or if ample opportunity to challenge the order does not exist, 
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III. KING'S LETTER 
King understood Creon's tragic error. Addressing the NAACP in 
Atlanta nine months before the Birmingham march, King reminded 
his law-oriented audience that "legislation and court orders can only 
declare rights. They can never thoroughly deliver them. Only when 
the people themselves begin to act are rights on paper given life 
blood."109 So apt is this response to the final sentences of Stewart's 
Walker opinion that it is almost as though King had peered into the 
future to read it. Where the Court sought its panacea in "the civilizing 
hand of law" rather than "the petitioners' impatient commitment to 
their cause,"110 King found legal rights only where "the people them-
selves begin to act." In the same Atlanta speech King sounded some 
of the motifs that would later appear in his Letter, and indeed em-
ployed several of the similes and comparisons that we shall later ex-
amine; in part, the Atlanta speech amounts to a prototype of the 
Letter. It shows how deeply King was thinking about the basic ten-
sion between juridical institutions and community as the true source of 
legal authority. 
King's Letter is a prophetic call to community; so much is obvious 
from the moment that he enunciates his basic thought: "We are 
or if complying with the order would irremediably damage a party. Assume that none of these 
problems arise in the case of an injunction. Even then, except in one circumstance, demonstra-
tors should be able to avoid punishment for contemning a court order by showing that the order 
was unconstitutional. The exception is this: when the act of disobedience itself consists of irre-
versibly and wrongfully damaging someone - for example, by revealing legitimately confidential 
information, or committing a violent crime - then parties may be punished for contemning the 
order whether or not it was constitutional. The exception is intended to grant courts authority to 
issue enforceable unconstitutional orders to deter intentional, wrongful damage to other people 
in emergency circumstances like those in Shipp (the lynching case discussed supra note 87). Now 
this exception seems to beg the same questions of judicial authority I have been accusing the 
Court of begging, since it allows courts to exceed their constitutional authority. But the reason 
for the exception has nothing to do with courts in particular; rather, I believe that anyone should 
be able to stop intentional, wrongful damage to other people by proportional means, even when 
those means are illegal. I am thinking here of something like the German law of ''.justifying 
emergency": "Whoever, in the face of an immediate and not otherwise preventable danger to 
life, limb ... or other rights performs an act in order to hinder the danger ... does not act 
illegally if, upon balancing the conflicting interests, particularly the rights concerned and the 
degree of danger which threatens them, the protected interest outweighs the impaired interest 
significantly .... " Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] sec. 34. The issue is not a grant of extraordinary 
political authority to courts; rather, it is a recognition of extraordinary authority that vests in all 
of us in the face of an emergency. Note also that the exception in the rule I am proposing applies 
only when the act of disobedience itself wrongfully injures someone; it does not apply when the 
act itself is not wrongful or injurious, even in situations in which as it happens injuries result. In 
Project C, even if the nonviolent march provoked others to violence, the marchers could not be 
punished for contemning Judge Jenkins' order under the rule I favor. Nor does the rule permit 
"anarchy"; violators of court orders run the risk that at their contempt hearings the order will be 
upheld, in which case they will be punished. 
109. Quoted in T. BRANCH, supra note 24, at 598. 
110. Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 321 (1967). 
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caught in an inescapable network of mutuality, tied in a single gar-
ment of destiny." 111 And by its invocation of community - an entity 
or category so strikingly absent in the Walker opinion - King's is a 
voicing of the Birmingham events that is supplementary or dual to the 
Walker Court's. King repopulates the Creonic desert over which the 
Court has elected to preside. But King, like the Court, is unsure 
whether to issue his call in religious or secular terms. The Letter in 
fact has it both ways; therein lies its power but also its deficiency. I 
shall explain this by looking closely at King's political narratives, his 
identifications of the actions of himself and his fellow demonstrators 
with episodes of a larger, more universal history - or, more precisely, 
with several such histories, some of which are religious in character, 
some secular. First, to help orient the reader, I briefly summarize the 
Letter. 
After an initial greeting to his "fellow clergymen,"112 King ad-
dresses the various accusations that the eight clergymen had leveled in 
their newspaper advertisement. To the charge that he and his fellow 
organizers are outside agitators, King asserts the "interrelatedness of 
all communities and states," and likens himself to St. Paul answering 
the Macedonian call. 113 To the charge that the demonstrations are 
"unwise and untimely," King responds by reviewing Birmingham's 
history of racism and of broken promises to the civil rights movement 
and outlines the careful steps taken by the campaign to prepare itself 
for nonviolence. 114 To the charge that the demonstrators have substi-
tuted confrontation for negotiation, King responds that it is naive to 
believe that negotiation will ever take place unless the demonstrators 
have forced it by creating a "tension" in the community. 115 To the 
charge that the demonstrators are forcing the issue before giving the 
Boutwell administration time to do what it can in race relations, King 
suggests that Boutwell, like Connor, is a segregationist, differing from 
the latter only in that Connor is more crude. In the most moving and 
urgent paragraph of the Letter, he meditates bitterly on the evils of 
segregation to illustrate one of his main themes: that "it is easy for 
those who have never felt the stinging darts of segregation to say, 
'Wait,' " 116 but wholly unreasonable to expect long-suffering blacks to 
remain patient in their suffering. 
111. KING, Letter, supra note 13, at 79. 
112. Id. at 77. 
113. Id. at 78. 
114. Id. at 79-81. 
115. Id. at 81-82. 
116. Id. at 82-83. 
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Next, King addresses a charge that is close to the issue in Walker. 
How can King ask whites to comply with Brown v. Board of Education 
if he is himself prepared to disobey a court order that he doesn't like? 
In response, King sketches an argument based on a series of distinc-
tions from the natural law tradition: One is obligated to obey just law, 
but to disobey unjust law. Just law is law that uplifts human personal-
ity, whereas unjust law is law that degrades it. Segregation laws, by 
giving whites a false sense of superiority and blacks a false sense of 
inferiority, degrade human personality, whereas an integrationist de-
cree such as Brown uplifts it and is consequently just. Alternatively, 
just law is law that applies evenhandedly to minorities and majorities 
- it is "sameness made legal" - whereas unjust law is law that does 
not - it is "difference made legal"; by this criterion as well, segrega-
tion laws and Brown differ fundamentally. Finally, a just law, such as 
an ordinance requiring marchers to obtain a parade permit, can be 
enforced selectively (as in Judge Jenkins's injunction), in which case it 
too is difference made legal and hence unjust. Ergo, Brown's decree 
must be obeyed and segregation laws (including Judge Jenkins's in-
junction) must be disobeyed. 117 
After answering the white clergymen's accusations, King launches 
his own. He expresses dismay at white "moderates," who are "more 
devoted to 'order' than to justice," who agree with the movement's 
goals but characterize all of its methods as too extreme, and who be-
lieve fallaciously that the passage of time will in and of itself end segre-
gation without demonstrators forcing matters. 118 In response, he 
condemns "the strangely irrational notion that there is something in 
the very flow of time that will inevitably cure all ills"; 119 he then re-
minds his readers that it is not his nonviolent movement but black 
nationalist groups such as the Muslims who stand at the extreme of 
the race issue. 120 King then reflects that on second thought he should 
willingly accept the "extremist" label, for it puts him in very good 
company. Since it will concern us later, I reproduce this vital para-
graph here for convenience: 
But though I was initially disappointed at being categorized as an 
extremist, as I continued to think about the matter I gradually gained a 
measure of satisfaction from the label. Was not Jesus an extremist for 
love: "Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them 
that hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use you, and perse-
117. Id. at 84-86. 
118. Id. at 87-93. 
119. Id. at 89. 
120. Id. at 90-92. 
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cute you." Was not Amos an extremist for justice: "Let justice roll 
down like waters and righteousness like an ever-flowing stream." Was 
not Paul an extremist for the Christian gospel: "I bear in my body the 
marks of the Lord Jesus." Was not Martin Luther an extremist: "Here 
I stand; I cannot do otherwise, so help me God." And John Bunyan: "I 
will stay in jail to the end of my days before I make a butchery of my 
conscience." And Abraham Lincoln: "This nation cannot survive half 
slave and half free." And Thomas Jefferson: "We hold these truths to 
be self-evident, that all men are created equal .... " 121 
For future reference, let us refer to this as the "extremism passage." 
We shall return to it several times. 
In the concluding pages of the Letter, King excoriates the white 
churches for their failure to embrace the cause of civil rights as a fun-
damental moral matter. 122 In a prophetic mode, King castigates the 
churches for urging compliance with civil rights laws merely as a mat-
ter of prudence rather than welcoming blacks as brothers and sis-
ters; 123 he thunders that the churches themselves will face a day of 
reckoning for their moral failings. 124 Finally, King criticizes the cler-
gymen for congratulating the Birmingham police for "preventing vio-
lence"; King bitterly points out that this ignores the police dogs and 
the violence employed by the police out of sight of the cameras, not to 
mention that their public restraint was merely a tactic in the service of 
segregation. 125 In the end, however, King offers a conciliatory closing 
salutation: "I hope this letter finds you strong in the faith. I also hope 
that circumstances will soon make it possible for me to meet each of 
you, not as an integrationist or a civil rights leader but as a fellow 
clergyman and a Christian brother."126 
This, however, is a bare summary. The true meaning of the Letter 
lies more in the detailed narratives King offers than in the larger struc-
ture of his argument. I shall be focusing on King's identifications of 
himself and his fellow demonstrators with a variegated but carefully 
chosen collection of other historical actors. In what I have labeled the 
"extremism passage,"127 and elsewhere in the Letter, King identifies 
with biblical characters (Paul, Amos, Jesus, Shadrach, Meshach, and 
Abednego); with Christian dissidents (unnamed Christian martyrs, 
Luther, Bunyan); with theological thinkers (Augustine, Aquinas, 
121. Id. at 92. 
122. Id. at 93-98. 
123. Id. at 94. 
124. Id. at 96. 
125. Id. at 98-99. 
126. Id. at 100. 
127. Supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
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Buber, Tillich); with American egalitarians (Jefferson, Lincoln); and 
with the patron saint of civil disobedience (Socrates). Together, these 
self-identifications generate a dense and, as we shall see, multiply am-
biguous political narrative. 
A. King's Local Narrative 
My primary focus will be on King's political narratives, his efforts 
to make legal sense of a larger history of which the Birmingham cam-
paign forms just one episode, rather than his local narrative of the 
Birmingham events. This is because King's local narrative - his de-
scription of the Birmingham campaign - tries not to be self-con-
tained, but rather points explicitly outside itself toward the larger 
political narrative. The local narrative is, to borrow a term from the 
philosophy of science, "theory laden" to a remarkable extent. King 
organizes his account of the Birmingham campaign around a theory of 
direct action rather than a chronological sequence of events. "In any 
nonviolent campaign there are four basic steps: collection of the facts 
to determine whether injustices exist; negotiation; self-purification; 
and direct action. We have gone through all these steps in Birming-
ham." 128 Having propounded this schema, King proceeds in ordered 
sequence to describe Birmingham's racist predilections ("to determine 
whether injustices exist"), the events leading up to the demonstrations, 
including prior attempts at negotiation ("negotiation"), and the plan-
ning of the demonstrations, including workshops in nonviolence 
("self-purification"). The local narrative he develops in this way is 
richer and more inclusive than that of the Walker Court; instead of a 
reductionist recounting of the event as an encounter between authority 
and individuals, King's narrative vocabulary also includes the civil 
rights organization and the Birmingham white community itself. 
What is noteworthy about King's local narrative, however - apart 
from the striking set of categories he uses to organize it - is that he 
says virtually nothing about the demonstrations themselves, the fourth 
step of his schematism ("direct action"). Or rather, he says virtually 
nothing about the march, the crowds, the arrest, or the injunction.129 
Instead, he recounts the events by describing what he takes to be the 
political and spiritual import of direct action: 
Nonviolent direct action seeks to create such a crisis and foster such a 
tension that a community which has constantly refused to negotiate is 
forced to confront the issue. It seeks so to dramatize the issue that it can 
128. KING, Letter, supra note 13, at 79. 
129. He does, however, describe these events in his 1964 memoir of the Birmingham cam-
paign. M.L. KING, New Day in Birmingham, in WHY WE CAN'T WAIT 55-75 (1964). 
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no longer be ignored .... Just as Socrates felt that it was necessary to 
create a tension in the mind so that individuals could rise from the bond-
age of myths and half-truths to the unfettered realm of creative analysis 
and objective appraisal, so must we see the need for nonviolent gadflies 
to create the kind of tension in society that will help men rise from the 
dark depths of prejudice and racism to the majestic heights of under-
standing and brotherhood. 
The purpose of our direct-action program is to create a situation so 
crisis-packed that it will inevitably open the door to negotiation. 130 
King, I believe, purposely refuses to recount the events without sub-
suming them within an account of their purpose. 131 In his narrative 
vocabulary, a march or a sit-in simply resists flat-footedly behavioral 
narration. A sit-in attempts to dramatize an issue, and thus to refer 
beyond itself. And so to describe it in behavioral terms without build-
ing that dramatic function into the description would be as misleading 
as a description of Othello choking Desdemona that omits the fact 
that the action is occurring in a play. To take another example - one 
that is highly pertinent to King's spiritualized understanding of a di-
rect action campaign - a religious revelation may well resist flat-
footedly behavioral narration. ("St. So-and-So knelt in prayer. Two 
hours later she stood up. That's all, folks!") The physical events that 
transpired on April 12, 1963 are, in King's narrative apparatus, 
shadow-events or bare husks whose recitation - here we must think 
of Stewart's local narrative in Walker - misleads and misses the truth 
of what occurred: a local narrative of crisis and creative tension. 132 
King's Socratic allusion in the passage I have just quoted is surely 
intended as a conscious underscoring of this point. The allusion to 
"ris[ing] from the bondage of myths and half-truths" is a reference to 
the famous allegory of the Cave in book 6 of Plato's Republic, which 
likens us to spectators of a shadow drama projected on a wall. Ac-
cording to Socrates, we mistake the shadows for reality, completely 
130. KING, Letler, supra note 13, at 81-82. 
131. This, of course, is a strategy that runs the risk of self-deception or even whitewash, of 
substituting an idealized picture of what one hoped to do for an accurate rendition of what one in 
fact did. In my view, however, the Birmingham campaign actually lived up to the description 
that King offers in the Letter, so no self-deception or whitewash actually occurs. 
132. This is not to deny that sometimes it is appropriate to insist on the behavioral narration. 
The terrorist group insists that it merely dramatized the plight of its people (by setting off a car-
bomb in a crowded street); we rightly insist that what it did was set off a car-bomb in a crowded 
street. The administration claims that it is signaling support for democratic institutions in Cen-
tral America; we rightly insist that it is aiding and abetting right-wing murders and tortures. 
When the dramatic act is ma/um in se, when it consists of support for violence or violation of 
human rights, that fact swamps the expressive character of the act and becomes the only appro-
priate description. In the case of the Birmingham campaign, however, this is not the circum-
stance, and it would be as misleading to describe the demonstration as an unauthorized parade as 
it would to describe it as a pleasant stroll down the street. 
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overlooking the solid objects whose images we are contemplating. 133 
Once we have grasped the appropriateness of this allusion, we un-
derstood why King substitutes a conceptual narrative of the Birming-
ham campaign for a journalistic account of the events: the journalistic 
account mistakes shadows for reality. For what occurred on April 12, 
1963 was not a march followed by an arrest, but a maieutic drama 
"bring[ing] to the surface the hidden tension that is already alive. We 
bring it out in the open, where it can be seen and dealt with."134 The 
bulk of King's Letter, including its philosophical arguments as well as 
its political narratives, is an attempt to make good this description. 
The Walker opinion and King's Letter are in an odd way mirror 
images of each other. Walker devotes most of its attention to its local 
narrative, its recitation of the events of April 10-12, 1963. This is un-
surprising: since the Court has presumed the position of authority, it 
need not concentrate its efforts on political narrative, since its author-
ity very literally speaks for itself. By contrast, King devotes most of 
his attention to the political narrative that will confer legitimacy on 
the Birmingham campaign; his local narrative of the events is abbrevi-
ated, for that narrative will make sense only when King's political nar-
rative has persuaded us that the marches and sit-ins are indeed mere 
husks of a more profound story. Let us turn then to King's political 
narratives. 
B. King's Biblical Allusions 
The literary prototype of King's Letter is immediately apparent: 
the letter is modeled after the epistles of Paul. 135 King confirms this 
when he writes, "[J]ust as the Apostle Paul left his little village of 
Tarsus and carried the gospel of Jesus Christ to the far corners of the 
Greco-Roman world, so am I compelled to carry the gospel of free-
dom beyond my own home town. Like Paul, I must constantly re-
spond to the Macedonian call for aid." 136 The reference is to the Book 
of Acts. "And a vision appeared to Paul in the night: a man of Mace-
donia was standing beseeching him and saying, Come over to Macedo-
133. PLATO, REPUBLIC *514a-18b. For a useful discussion of the myth of the Cave, see 
Fogelin, Three Platonic Analogies, 80 PHIL. REV. 371 (1971). 
134. KING, Letter, supra note 13, at 88. 
135. Consider, for example, King's closing salutation: "I hope this letter finds you strong in 
the faith. I also hope that circumstances will soon make it possible for me to meet each of you, 
not as an integrationist or a civil-rights leader but as a fellow clergyman and a Christian 
brother." KING, Letter, supra note 13, at 100. The contemporary references apart, the language 
resonates with Paul's various salutations (perhaps especially with Ephesians, when Paul like King 
was a prisoner). 
136. KING, Letter, supra note 13, at 78. 
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nia, and help us."137 As we shall see, it is highly significant that King 
likens himself to Paul of the Book of Acts, for this Book is the portion 
of the Bible closest in its utopian and communitarian ecstasy to King's 
own basic thought, "We are caught in an inescapable network of mu-
tuality, tied in a single garment of destiny. Whatever affects one di-
rectly, affects all indirectly."138 
None of King's biblical guises - Paul, Amos, Jesus, or even Sha-
drach, Meshach, and Abednego - are accidental. But Paul's is the 
most evident, since his guise shapes the literary form of the Letter. 
Why does King assume the guise of Paul? The answer should be clear 
when we recollect his audience: eight white clergymen. For King, the 
fact that they were white and the fact that they were clergy combined 
irresistibly to suggest a parallel with Paul's evangelism, his efforts to 
weld the people of many nations into a City of God. Paul's epistles are 
directed to small, insular Christian communities amid larger unbeliev-
ing nations. The Letter is nothing short of a reminder to brethren in 
Christ that, black or white, they are, indeed, brethren in Christ, there-
fore bound together by a bond that knows no distinction of skin 
color. 139 
The Letter is more particular than that, however, as we realize 
when we turn to the Biblical passages to which King refers. These are: 
the Book of Acts, the Book of Amos, Paul's Epistle to the Galatians, 
the Sermon on the Mount, and the Book of Daniel. I take these up in 
turn. 140 
In structure, recall, King's Letter proceeds from a justification of 
the Project C demonstrations and of nonviolent civil disobedience 
more generally to an Old Testament denunciation of contemporary 
iniquity, particularly the iniquity of pusillanimous white "moderates" 
and the Southern churches. King moves along a course from commu-
nitarian creed to prophetic menace: "But the judgment of God is 
upon the church as never before."141 All this is on the surface; but it is 
137. Acts 16:9. (I use the Revised Standard Version of the Bible except where noted.) 
138. KING, Letter, supra note 13, at 79. 
139. King's rhetoric, however, did not sway Episcopal Bishop C.C. Jones Carpenter, the 
instigator of the clerical attack on King that provoked the Letter. 
Bishop Carpenter sat down in his study with a copy of King's mammoth reply. He read the 
letter through to the end, then turned to his bishop coadjutor, George Murray, with a sigh 
of resignation. "This is what you get when you try to do something," he said. "You get it 
from both sides. George, you just have to live with that." Carpenter felt abused and misun· 
derstood for his efforts to act as a progressive force in race relations. The clash of emotion 
turned him, like his great-grandfather, into a more strident Confederate. 
T. BRANCH, supra note 24, at 745. 
140. In an order chosen for ease of exposition, though it is not King's own order. 
141. KING, Letter, supra note 13, at 96. 
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also in the depths, contained in the biblical allusions that King de-
ploys, knowing that the clergy who read it would embed it in the bibli-
cal narratives it invokes. 
Thus, the prophetic stance of King's Letter is exhibited clearly in 
the contrast between the early Christians described in the most explic-
itly communitarian - even communistic - passages of Acts, the 
Book to which King points us in his evocation of Paul's call from the 
Macedonians, and the corrupted Israelites whose religious offerings 
God angrily rejects in the denunciations of Amos to which King later 
alludes. Thus the Book of Acts: "And all who believed were together 
and had all things in common; and they sold their possessions and 
goods and distributed them to all, as any had need."142 "Now the 
company of those who believed were of one heart and soul, and no one 
said that any of the things which he possessed was his own, but they 
had everything in common."143 "There was not a needy person 
among them, for as many as were possessors of lands or houses sold 
them, and brought the proceeds of what was sold and laid it at the 
apostles' feet; and distribution was made to each as any had need."144 
It is noteworthy, and scarcely coincidental, that Marx remembered 
these passages when, in his most utopian writing, he attributed to the 
future communist society the principle "from each according to his 
ability, to each according to his needs!"145 For these passages from 
Acts have inspired utopian communists for over a thousand years. 146 
Moreover, they inspired the Social Gospel theologian Walter Raus-
chenbusch to draw parallels between the Bible and Marxism, in a book 
that impressed King deeply in his seminary days.141 
This is the City of God as it should be. Compare this with King's 
reference to the Book of Amos, one of the Bible's most vituperative 
denunciations of the actual community's unrighteousness. The line he 
quotes from Amos is this: "Let justice roll down like waters and right-
eousness like an ever-flowing stream."148 Amos' line appears in the 
context of a ghastly denunciation of a corrupted Israel: 
Therefore because you trample upon the poor and take from him exac-
tions of wheat, you have built houses of hewn stone, but you shall not 
dwell in them; you have planted pleasant vineyards, but you shall not 
drink their wine. For I know how many are your transgressions, and 
142. Acts 2:44-45. 
143. Acts 4:32. 
144. Acts 4:34-35. 
145. K. MARX, CRITIQUE OF THE GOTHA PROGRAMME IO (C. Dutt ed. 1938). 
146. See N. COHN, THE PURSUIT OF THE MILLENNIUM 194, 197 {rev. ed. 1970). 
147. See T. BRANCH, supra note 24, at 73. 
148. KING, Letter, supra note 13, at 92. 
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how great are your sins-you who afflict the righteous, who take a bribe, 
and turn aside the needy in the gate. 149 
The applicability of these charges to the segregated South need 
scarcely be remarked ("turning aside the needy in the gate" may well 
stand as a literal description of Bull Connor's action in arresting King 
and his fellow demonstrators as they marched to downtown Birming-
ham). And because of these sins, religious observances will avail the 
unrighteous not at all: 
I hate, I despise your feasts, and I take no delight in your solemn assem-
blies. Even though you offer me your burnt offerings and cereal offer-
ings, I will not accept them, and the peace offerings of your fatted beasts 
I will not look upon. Take away from me the noise of your songs; to the 
melody of your harps I will not listen. But let justice roll down like wa-
ters, and righteousness like an ever-flowing stream.1so 
The line King quotes thus appears in a passage that would convey a 
stem, even terrifying reminder to the clergymen to whom King's letter 
is addressed. 
As I noted earlier, King likens himself (for the second time in the 
Letter) to Paul immediately following his reference to Amos in the 
extremism passage. This reference too directs us to a biblical passage 
fraught with significance, for it bears with startling directness on 
King's confrontation with the courts. The line King quotes, "I bear in 
my body the marks of the Lord Jesus,"151 appears at the end of the 
Epistle to the Galatians, the most fervid of all New Testament declara-
tions that love and community stand above the law. Paul could not be 
more blunt: "Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law .... " 152 
And again: "Now before faith came, we were confined under the law, 
kept under restraint until faith should be revealed. So that the law was 
our custodian until Christ came, that we might be justified by faith. 
But now that faith has come, we are no longer under a custodian 
•••• "
153 Paul evokes the mystical, hence translegal, character of egali-
tarian community in language that resonates with King's aspirations 
for the redeemed American polity: "There is neither Jew nor Greek, 
there is neither slave nor free, there is neither male nor female; for you 
149. Amos 5:11-12. 
150. Amos 5:21-24 (emphasis added). The line was evidently dear to King, for he repeated it 
in the "I have a dream" speech in the March on Washington a few months later; moreover, King 
had used it in the first political speech of his career, the address to the mass meeting called after 
the arrest of Rosa Parks for refusing to move to the back of the bus in MontgomerY that pro· 
pelled him to leadership of the MontgomerY bus boycott. T. BRANCH, supra note 24, at 141. 
151. KING, Letter, supra note 13, at 92 (quoting Galatians 6:17). 
152. Galatians 3:13. 
153. Galatians 3:23-25. 
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are all one in Christ Jesus."154 (Compare this with the finale of the "I 
have a dream" speech: "all of God's children -black men and white 
men, Jews and Gentiles, Protestants and Catholics - will be able to 
join hands .... " 155) "For the whole law is fulfilled in one word, 'You 
shall love your neighbor as yourself.' " 156 Community and brother-
hood in faith trump fidelity to established law. Indeed, the Book of 
Acts, which we have seen forms one of King's referential reservoirs, 
itself contains an explicit statement of the same antinomian principle: 
"We must obey God rather than men.'' 157 
This carries us quite naturally to King's reference to Jesus. The 
"Love your enemies" verse that King quotes in the extremism passage 
appears, of course, in. the Sermon on the Mount. 158 Significantly, it is 
the continuation of this verse: "You have heard that it was said, 'You 
shall love your neighbor and hate your enemy.' But I say to you, Love 
your enemies and pray for those who persecute you.'' 159 Christ's allu-
sion here is to Leviticus 19:18, "You shall not take vengeance or bear 
any grudge against the sons of your own people, but you shall love 
your neighbor as yourself: I am the Lord.'' He interprets the Leviti-
can injunction to love your neighbor as a negative pregnant: an im-
plicit restriction of the injunction to those who are like oneself; the 
Sermon on the Mount radicalizes the message of love by extending it 
to those unlike oneself. Small wonder that King would invoke this 
154. Galatians 3:28. 
155. Quoted in D. GARROW, supra note 20, at 284. 
156. Galatians 5:14. See Leviticus 19:18, which places "You shall love your neighbor as 
yourself" as but one of the Mosaic commandments - though Hillel would later enunciate the 
Golden Rule as the entire teaching of the Torah. 
Robert Cover has offered a complex argument that Paul, in Galatians 4:22-31, invokes a 
hidden subversive theme, closely tied to the problem of legal legitimacy that we have been exam-
ining, that animated the entire Old Testament. Cover, supra note I, at 19-25. One of the most 
important Mosaic laws concerned the right of the firstborn son to a double portion of the father's 
inheritance. Deuteronomy 21:15-17. As Cover points out, this law is violated in the stories of 
Cain and Abel, of Ishmael and Isaac, of Jacob and Esau, of Joseph and his brothers, of Solo-
mon's rise to the Davidic throne, of Moses' dominance over Aaron, of the Prophet Samuel's birth 
and assumption of the place of Eli, and of David's succession to the throne of Saul - each of 
which involves a catapulting of a younger son over the elders. Cover argues that the meaning of 
this tension between the law of succession and these key biblical narratives is "first, that the rule 
of succession can be overturned; second, that it takes a conviction of divine destiny to overturn it; 
and third, that divine destiny is likely to manifest itself precisely in overturning this specific 
rule." Cover, supra note 1, at 22. It is to one of these stories, that of Hagar and Ishmael, that 
Paul points in the passage in Galatians, which Cover characterizes as a "revolutionary allegorical 
extension of the typology." Id. at 24. It is not my argument that King himself drew these 
connections; but it is my argument that King meant consciously to invoke a biblical text that 
glorifies the violation of legal precepts in the name of divine destiny. 
157. Acts 5:29. Cover refers to this principle as "a religious rule of recognition," functionally 
equivalent and therefore directly contradictory to the supremacy clause of article VI, section 2 of 
the Constitution. Cover, supra note 1, at 30. 
158. Matthew 5:44. 
159. Matthew 5:43-44 (emphasis added). 
2198 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 87:2152 
biblical passage, since extending the injunction of love from one's own 
people to all people is precisely the universalist and cosmopolitan 
theme of King's Letter. 16o 
A more important point is this. We recall that in the Epistle to the 
Galatians, to which King alludes shortly after his reference to Jesus, 
Paul takes this passage from the Sermon on the Mount to reject the 
Mosaic law. ("Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law . . . . For 
the whole law is fulfilled in one word, 'You shall love your neighbor as 
yourself.' " 161) Yet this is not how Christ himself characterized the 
Sermon's import. On the contrary, Christ cautions, "Think not that I 
have come to abolish the law and the prophets; I have come not to 
abolish them but to fulfil them. For truly, I say to you, till heaven and 
earth pass away, not an iota, not a dot, will pass from the law until all 
is accomplished."162 
Now it is possible to reconcile Paul's and Christ's characterizations 
of what Christ has done to the law when he proclaims "Love your 
neighbor as yourself." Christ has proclaimed, "I am not come to abol-
ish [the law] but to fulfill," and Paul satisfies the letter of this warning 
when he writes, "For the whole law is fulfilled in one word, You shall 
love your neighbor as yourself." Yet that is surely not what Christ 
preached in the Sermon, where "You shall love your neighbor as your-
self" appears as but one of a dozen or more revaluations of the Mosaic 
law, occupying no privileged position. Paul's is an idiosyncratic rein-
terpretation of Christ's own word, transforming the Sermon on the 
Mount into an antinomian religion of love. · 
There is, however, another way to reconcile the attitudes toward 
law expressed in these two biblical passages (if not their religious sub-
stance). Paul understands the Sermon on the Mount to be Christ's 
radicalization, or purposive revaluation, of the Mosaic law - a radi-
calization that amounts to its rejection. Christ demands the fulfill-
ment of the law's underlying purpose, which indeed annihilates it as 
(mis)interpreted by the "scribes and Pharisees." 163 On this reading, 
Paul's antinomian dicta merely make explicit what was indeed implicit 
in the Sermon: that in the fulfillment of the law's spirit lies the de-
struction of its received juristic interpretation. And King, by juxta-
160. It is worth pointing out that the traditional Jewish understanding of Leviticus 19:18 is 
not "Love your neighbor and hate your enemy," but rather is fully as universalist and cosmopoli-
tan as Christ's own message. See J. HERTZ, THE PENTATEUCH AND HAFfORAHS 501 nn. 563-
64 (2d ed. 1981); see also A. COHEN, EVERYMAN'S TALMUD 212-16 (1949). This is one of the 
theological points that divides Jews from Christians. 
161. Galatians 3: 13, 5: 14. 
162. Matthew 5:17-18. 
163. Matthew 5:20. 
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posing the Sermon with Paul's epistle to the Galatians, invites his 
readers to interpret the sermon in just this way: as an authoritative 
unofficial reading of the law that in effect overthrows the official read-
ing. As we shall see, King's own analysis of legality in the Letter takes 
just such a tack. 
Notwithstanding this interpretive finesse, there is no denying that 
Paul's "Christ has redeemed us from the curse of the law" and the 
Sermon on the Mount's "Do not think that I have come to abolish the 
Law" are quite different in tenor and import - the latter assuming the 
mantle of legality, the former proclaiming what Kierkegaard would 
have deemed a "teleological suspension of the legal." 164 It will be part 
of my argument that King's Letter itself vacillates between these two 
stances, with important consequences. 
The fact that King evidently saw no inconsistency between the Ser-
mon on the Mount and the epistle to the Galatians is important, for 
Paul's equation of the law's end with the law's fulfillment readily 
transposes into a justification of King's civil rights activity: if there is 
any obvious legal theme to the Letter it is that the end of the segrega-
tionist legal order is the fulfillment, the purposive revaluation, of the 
constitutional promise of equal protection. (I return to this point be-
low.) King's is an authoritative unofficial reading of the Constitution 
that overthrows Southern officials' readings. 
The final Biblical reference I shall discuss in the Letter appears 
when he likens the demonstrators' civil disobedience to "the refusal of 
Shadrach, Meshach and Abednego to obey the laws of Nebuchadnez-
zar, on the ground that a higher moral law was at stake."165 The ref-
erence, to Daniel 3:8-30, is straightforward and transparent, but it is 
worth noting one peculiarity in the story. After Shadrach, Meshach, 
and Abednego were thrown into the fiery furnace for disobeying Neb-
uchadnezzar's command in order to remain faithful to their God, the 
Book of Daniel relates: 
And these three men, Shadrach, Meshach, and Abednego, fell down 
bound into the midst of the burning fiery furnace. Then Nebuchadnez-
zar the king was astonished, and rose up in haste, and spake, and said 
unto his counselors, Did we not cast three men bound into the midst of 
the fire? They answered and said unto the king, True, 0 king. He an-
swered and said, Lo, I see four men loose, walking in the midst of the 
164. Kierkegaard actually spoke of the teleological suspension of the ethical, not the legal. S. 
KIERKEGAARD, FEAR AND TREMBLING 64-77 (Lowrie trans. 1954). He used the term to de-
scribe Abraham's murderous attempt to sacrifice Isaac, which could be justified teleologically by 
reference to the miraculous commandment of God, though viewed from the sphere of the ethical 
it could never be regarded as anything but a transgression. 
165. KING, Letter, supra note 13, at 86-87. 
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fire, and they have no hurt; and the form of the fourth is like the Son of 
God.166 
This passage is often taken by Christians to prefigure the New Testa-
ment, and thus the Christian Aufhebung (to use Hegel's term meaning 
at once cancellation and preservation) of the Old Testament and the 
Mosaic law. As in the other allusions we have examined, King evokes 
a biblical context that suggests the finitude and inadequacy of law 
before the experience of an egalitarian, loving community. 
Let me summarize my reading of King's biblical allusions. The 
key points are these. 
(1) King underscores his own communitarianism by invoking the 
God-intoxicated, overtly communistic, egalitarian Christian commu-
nity of the Book of Acts. 
(2) King places the cosmopolitan and universalist message of the 
civil rights movement side-by-side with cosmopolitan and universalist 
passages of the Bible such as "There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is 
neither slave nor free, there is neither male nor female; for you are all 
one in Christ Jesus"167 and the Sermon on the Mount. 
(3) King echoes his denunciation of the existing church by allud-
ing to Amos' denunciations of Israel for empty, impious observances 
of a law that has become merely formal. 
(4) Crucially, King singles out passages in which the formal legal-
ity of Israel is either fulfilled - aufgehoben, to utilize Hegel's word 
once again - by the Christian law of love or, in the important alterna-
tive, annihilated by it. 168 That is, King points ambiguously in the in-
compatible directions of a higher law of love or a divine 
antinomianism. And thus the earlier themes of communitarianism, 
cosmopolitanism, and denunciation waffie dangerously between natu-
ral law legalism - a theme that is capable of purely secular develop-
ment - and mystical anarchism, a doctrine of love grounded in the 
revelation of divinity. Insofar as King identifies himself more closely 
with Paul than with Jesus, he seems to tilt a bit more toward the latter 
alternative. 
(5) This is in no way to deny that King speaks often and rever-
166. Daniel 3:23-25 (King James Version). The Hebrew bar Elohim is coupled with a verb-
form implying the indefinite article: "a Son of God" - which weakens the New Testament 
prefiguration that the King James Bible question-beggingly builds into its translation. (Thanks 
to Steve Winter for the translation.) 
167. Galatians 3:28. 
168. In this respect, the New Testament allusions are fully consistent with Amos' denuncia-
tion of Israel's empty formalities and the King James Bible's version of Daniel 3:25 as a 
prefiguration of the New Testament. In all of them, Christians are likely to identify the 
Aujhebung of formal legality by love with the Aujhebung of the Old Testament by the New. 
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ently of the law: the natural law and legalist strain in the Letter is 
totally authentic. Yet legalism, too, becomes a communitarian and 
universalist tool in King's hands. For it is clear that King advocates 
what Levinson calls the "protestant" mode of legal interpretation, in 
which the individual, or at any rate the nonhierarchical community, 
retains ultimate interpretive authority. As we have seen, the Walker 
Court has built its entire argument around the necessity of the catholic 
approach, in which the Court/Church - the curia - is the sole re-
pository of interpretive authority. Levinson's eloquent argument for 
the coincidence of religious and constitutional hermeneutics is no-
where more telling than in the contrast between Walker and King's 
Letter. The contrast is simply Catholicism and Protestantism revis-
ited. Indeed, in King's Letter "protestant" interpretation of the Con-
stitution quite simply coincides with Protestantism itself, King's own 
religious commitment. This makes two of King's other self-identifica-
tions in the extremism passage fall immediately into place: "Was not 
Martin Luther an extremist: 'Here I stan,d; I cannot do otherwise, so 
help me God.' And John Bunyan: 'I will stay in jail to the end of my 
days before I make a butchery of my conscience.' " 169 Luther's 
"stand," of course, inaugurated the Protestant reformation, and 
Bunyan was jailed for his Puritan preaching.170 
(6) Finally, it is clear that King's chain ~f religious self-identifica-
tions, his transposition of the Birmingham events into a biblical key, 
offers a political narrative that refigures and reconstitutes the legal 
meaning of those events. In the sense explicated in my opening discus-
sion, King's "biblicizing" of the Birmingham campaign in the Letter is 
legal argumentation in the full and unqualified sense. 
C. King's Natural Law Theory 
The ambivalence I have described between King's natural law le-
galism and what I have called his mystical anarchism pervades the 
169. KING, Letter, supra note 13, at 92. Note that this is the continuation of the extremism 
passage we have been examining. 
170. However, Luther's own stance toward secular authority is considerably more quiescent 
than King's. See LUTHER, Temporal Authority: To What Extent It Should Be Obeyed, in LU-
THER: SELECTED POLITICAL WRITINGS 51 (J.M. Porter ed. 1974). Moreover, I find it dis-
turbing that King should liken himself to a tormented, dismal, and half-mad fanatic such as 
Bunyan. I write this footnote on February 16, 1989, as the newspapers report that an Iranian 
cleric has offered a one million dollar reward to any faithful Moslem who assassinates Salman 
Rushdie for his "blasphemous" novel Satanic Verses. Bunyan had more in common with this 
vicious cleric than with either King or Luther (though Luther himself burned the works of Pope 
Leo). For a delightfully opinionated but illuminating discussion, see Macaulay's article on 
Bunyan. 4 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 389 (14th ed. 1937). For a more sympathetic ac-
count, see c. HILL, A SOLDIER AND A POOR MAN: JOHN BUNYAN AND HIS CHURCH 1628-
1688 (1989). 
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argumentative or conceptual portion of the Letter just as it does the 
chain of biblical self-identifications. King's argument arises, recall, as 
an attempt to explain why he is willing to disobey a court order while 
continuing to urge white obedience to the Supreme Court's desegrega-
tion orders: "[T]here are two types of law: just and unjust. . . . One 
has not only a legal but a moral responsibility to obey just laws. Con-
versely, one has a moral responsibility to disobey unjust laws. I would 
agree with St. Augustine that 'an unjust law is no law at all.' " 171 
King then offers what I take to be two separate accounts of the distinc-
tion between just and unjust laws. The first is a theological and mysti-
cal account: 
A just law is a manmade code that squares with the moral law or the law 
of God. An unjust law is a code that is out of harmony with the moral 
law. To put it in the terms of St. Thomas Aquinas: An unjust law is a 
human law that is not rooted in eternal law and natural law. Any law 
that uplifts human personality is just. Any law that degrades human 
personality is unjust. All segregation statutes are unjust because segrega-
tion distorts the soul and damages the personality. It gives the segrega-
tor a false sense of superiority and the segregated a false sense of 
inferiority. Segregation, to use the terminology of the Jewish philoso-
pher Martin Buber, substitutes an "I-it" relationship for an "I-thou" re-
lationship and ends up relegating persons to the status of things. Hence 
segregation is not only politically, economically and sociologically un-
sound, it is morally wrong and sinful. Paul Tillich has said that sin is 
separation. Is not segregation an existential expression of man's tragic 
separation, his awful estrangement, his terrible sinfulness? Thus it is 
that I can urge men to obey the 1954 decision of the Supreme Court, for 
it is morally right; and I can urge them to disobey segregation ordi-
nances, for they are morally wrong. 172 
The second is a secular and essentially liberal argument based on con-
siderations of fairness: 
An unjust law is a qode that a numerical or power[ful] majority group 
compels a minority group to obey but does not make binding on itself. 
This is difference made legal. By the same token, a just law is a code that 
a majority compels a minority to follow and that it is willing to follow 
itself. This is sameness made legal. 
Let me give another explanation. A law is unjust if it is inflicted on a 
minority that, as a result of being denied the right to vote, had no part in 
enacting or devising the law .... Can any law enacted under such cir-
cumstances be considered democratically structured? 
Sometimes a law is just on its face and unjust in its application. For 
instance, I have been arrested on a charge of parading without a permit. 
Now, there is nothing wrong in having an ordinance which requires a 
permit for a parade. But such an ordinance becomes unjust when it is 
171. KING, Letter, supra note 13, at 84. 
172. Id. at 85. 
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used to maintain segregation and to deny citizens the First Amendment 
privilege of peaceful assembly and protest.173 
I take it that the difference between these two descriptions of natural 
law theory is readily apparent even on the surface. The first implicitly 
presumes that "eternal law and natural law" are fulfilled by the end of 
separation between human beings, the effacement of boundary and 
even of the very possibility of boundary signified by Buber's "basic 
word I-thou." For Buber, indeed, it understates matters even to say 
that "I-thou" entails a fusion of I and thou, for the very thought of 
two distinct entities that fuse belongs itself to the sphere of I-it. Here 
King's thought is close to Paul's insistence in Galatians that divine law 
achieves its fulfillment in the single injunction to love, and that "you 
are all one in Christ Jesus." This is communitarianism as mystical 
union. 
By contrast, the second characterization of natural law as "same-
ness made legal" emphasizes values of process, participation, and dem-
ocratic equality. In my view it is best understood as a version of the 
fair play argument of Hart and Rawls, according to which we are obli-
gated to obey the law only insofar as the law is a cooperative enter-
prise requiring and receiving widespread compliance to achieve its 
beneficial aims. 174 Insofar as the law is unfair ("difference made 
legal"), it cannot be understood as such a generally beneficial coopera-
tive scheme, and thus it loses its obligatory character. 
To lay my cards on the table, I believe that this argument is exactly 
right.175 But make no mistake: it is an argument wholly secular in 
character. It rests on a premise of human political equality that 
presumes no theological revelation of human unity in Christ (or out of 
Christ, for that matter). This premise arises from a nonbiblical polit-
ical narrative of the American Constitution; indeed, we shall see that 
King himself provides such a narrative in the extremism passage when 
he likens himself to Jefferson and Lincoln. 
The fair play argument, moreover, is grounded in the characteristi-
cally liberal political relationship of mutual respect, not in the mystical 
and loving communitarianism implicit in King's invocation of Buber 
and Tillich. 176 Obviously, the two arguments parallel each other in 
important respects: both ground legal obligation in equality, both at-
173. Id. at 85-86. 
174. Rawls, Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play, in LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 3, 9-10 
(S. Hook ed. 1964); Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, 64 PHIL REV. 175, 185 (1955). 
175. See D. LUBAN, supra note 90, at 32-49 (wherein I elaborate a solidarity-based theory of 
legal obligation understood as fair play, derived from King's Letter). 
176. On the distinction between respect and love, see Luban, The Quality of Justice, 66 DEN-
VER L. REV. 381, 413-16 (1989). 
2204 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 87:2152 
tack the monstrous premise of white superiority underlying racial seg-
regation, and both vindicate disobedience to segregation-preserving 
laws as well as obedience to the Court's Brown decision. But the dif-
ference between love and respect as defining relationships for the egali-
tarian community decisively distinguishes the two arguments. The 
purpose of any community-defining relationship is to establish social 
trust, but love and respect do so in quite different ways. 177 For the 
primary concern of love is to abolish the distance between people, 
while that of respect is to maintain it. 
Love, moreover, is an essentially antinomian relationship: as Ro-
berto Unger argues, love rejects the very tincture of formality, and a 
political order founded on love rejects ex ante limitations on the con-
tent of loving action. 178 Therein lies the promise, but also the danger, 
of founding a political order on love or mystical union. The promise is 
of political relationships of unimaginable richness. The danger is that, 
historically, love-based utopias - no matter how benign their origins 
- have so often been appropriated by totalitarian prophet-leaders ca-
pable of terrifying acts of violence, since there are no limitations on the 
content of ostensibly loving action. Consider the historical precursors 
of King's own Baptist Church, the Muenster Anabaptists of the six-
teenth century: 
On the morning of 27 February [1534] armed bands, urged on by 
Matthys in prophetic frenzy, rushed through the streets calling: "Get 
out, you godless ones, and never come back, you enemies of the Father!" 
In bitter cold, in the midst of a wild snowstorm, multitudes of the ''god-
less" were driven from the town by Anabaptists who rained blows upon 
them and laughed at their afflictions. These people included old people 
and invalids, small children and pregnant women and women who had 
just given birth .... By the morning of 3 March there were no "misbe-
lievers" left in Muenster; the town was inhabited solely by the Children 
of God. These people, who addressed one another as "Brother" and ''Sis-
ter," believed that they would be able to live without sin, in a community 
bound together by love alone. 179 
Now it is obvious that Martin Luther King, one of the greatest apos-
tles of nonviolence in history, had nothing in common with the 
Anabaptists or any of the other violent millenial movements. And, to 
repeat my basic point, King's antinomian communitarianism forms 
177. On trust as a defining relationship in moral and political theory, see N. LUHMANN, 
Trust: A Mechanism for the Reduction of Social Complexity, in TRUST AND POWER 1 (1979); 
Baier, Trust and Antitrust, 96 ETHICS 231 (1986); Baier, What Do Women Want in a Moral 
Theory?, 19 Nous 53 (1985); Luban, Legal Modernism, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1656, 1688-89 (1986). 
178. R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 206-09 (1976). 
179. N. COHN, supra note 146, at 262-63 (emphasis added). Many millenial movements 
founded themselves on the communistic passages of the Book of Acts; this included the Anabap-
tists. Id. at 259. 
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only one strand of the Letter; it is combined with a natural law legal-
ism that fully honors the liberal amenities. My invocation of the 
Anabaptists is intended merely to illustrate the instability and danger 
of founding political relationships on love rather than respect, and 
thus to underscore the distinction between love-based and respect-
based political orders (and thus the tension between King's religious 
and secular arguments). 180 
In short, the two versions of King's natural law argument in the 
Letter correspond to the ambiguity between viewing the Christian nar-
rative as a perfection of the law and as the mystical Aujhebung of it 
implicit in King's earlier juxtaposition of the Sermon on the Mount 
with Galatians. 
D. King's American Allusions 
This ambiguity emerges as well in the difference between King's 
biblical and secular political narratives. Just as King's biblical allu-
sions in the extremism passage point - ambiguously, to be sure- in 
the direction of antinomian mysticism, his secular allusions point to-
ward liberal natural law egalitarianism. The secular argument, recall, 
derives egalitarianism from the notion of fairness incipient in natural 
law. This entails a particular political narrative of American constitu-
tionalism, one that tells the story of constitutional progress as the 
drive toward emancipation and equality. 
Thus we find, immediately after King likens himself to Jesus, 
Amos, Paul, Luther, and Bunyan in the extremism passage, the invo-
cation of Lincoln and Jefferson: "Was not Martin Luther an extremist 
. . . . And John Bunyan . . . . And Abraham Lincoln: 'This nation 
cannot survive half slave and half free.' And Thomas Jefferson: 'We 
hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created 
equal. . . .' "1s1 
Jefferson and Lincoln are well-coupled. After all, it was Lincoln 
who, in the Gettysburg Address, claimed that the true meaning of 
America lay in Jefferson's Declaration of Independence rather than in 
the Constitution: he characterized America as "a new nation ... dedi-
cated to the proposition that all men are created equal." Dulled by 
180. It is in part for this reason that I take a very dim view of the "critique of rights" advo-
cated by some contemporary writers (Unger, Tushnet, Gabel); the vocabulary of rights expresses 
the discourse of mutual respect, and to abandon the centrality of mutual respect is to move in an 
unacceptable direction: either toward disrespect (domination and subservience) or toward a 
communitarianism oflove about which we may rightly be skeptical. See Luban, supra note 177, 
at 1679-81; Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals From Deconstructed Rights, 22 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401 (1987) (also expressing skepticism about the "critique of rights"). 
181. KING, Letter, supra note 13, at 92. 
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long familiarity, we are inclined to read this sentence without giving it 
a second thought (or even a first thought), without realizing that it is a 
powerfully heretical - because deconstitutionalized - interpretation 
of the meaning of American history. 182 King's political narrative 
draws a straight line from Jefferson and Lincoln through the civil war 
Amendments that finally constitutionalized this interpretation to the 
civil rights movement, and indicates that egalitarianism is the immi-
nent truth of America. 
He also, if I read him aright, alludes in the most powerful passage 
of the Letter to another link in this political narrative, the Court's 
opinion in Brown v. Board of Education. King bitterly meditates on 
his experience as a black parent, 
when you suddenly find your tongue twisted and your speech stammer-
ing as you seek to explain to your six-year-old daughter why she can't go 
to the public amusement park that has just been advertised on television, 
and see tears welling up in her eyes when she is told that Funtown is 
closed to colored children, and see ominous clouds of inferiority begin-
ning to form in her little mental sky, and see her beginning to distort her 
personality by developing an unconscious bitterness toward white 
people .... 183 
Surely King is here alluding to Kenneth Clark's experiments on self-
perceptions of inferiority among black children, which formed the so-
ciological linchpin of the Brown opinion. Rhetorically, the allusion is 
strikingly well-suited to the white clergymen to whom the Letter was 
addressed; just as his biblical allusions attempted to preach Christian 
community to the clergymen, the allusion to Brown attempts to re-
mind white Americans of their unkept promise of equality. As part of 
a political narrative, Brown is another point on the line from Jefferson 
through Lincoln and the fourteenth amendment to the civil rights 
movement - a narrative line that aims to recall the promise of egalita-
rian constitutionalism incipient in Brown as a continuation of Lin-
coln's and Jefferson's political vision. 
To summarize my reading so far, I have been tracing two versions 
of communitarianism in King's Letter: a religious and antinomian 
communitarianism based on love, and a liberal natural law egalitarian-
ism aiming at communities based on respect. King's biblical narra-
tives, particularly his self-identification with Paul, point ambiguously 
toward the former, whereas his American political narrative clearly 
points in the latter direction. 
182. See G. WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA: JEFFERSON'S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 
xiv-xxiv (1978); S. LEVINSON, supra note 14, at 140. 
183. KING, Letter, supra note 13, at 81. 
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E. King's Socratic Allusion 
King's Letter incorporates one final self-identification. At two 
points King likens his own actions in Birmingham and those of his 
fellow demonstrators to Socrates, who "felt that it was necessary to 
create a tension in the mind so that individuals could rise from the 
bondage of myths and half-truths to the unfettered realm of creative 
analysis and objective appraisal." 184- King goes on to analogize the 
Birmingham demonstrators to "nonviolent gadflies," Socrates' self-de-
scription in the Apology. 185 Later he alludes again to the condemna-
tion of Socrates: "Isn't [condemning the Birmingham demonstrators 
for provoking violence] like condemning Socrates because his un-
swerving commitment to truth and his philosophical inquiries precipi-
tated the act by the misguided populace in which they made him drink 
hemlock?" 186 Though I shall later have occasion to doubt the appro-
priateness of the Socratic analogy, there is indeed an uncanny parallel 
between the moral and legal problem posed by King's arrest and a 
perplexing dilemma posed in Plato's Apology and Crito. 
The dilemma is easily seen. In the Apology Socrates boasts that he 
has always been unwilling to comply with unjust official orders, in-
cluding court orders. Thus, when the Thirty Tyrants had ordered him 
to arrest Leon the Salaminian unjustly, so as "to implicate as many in 
their crimes as they could," Socrates merely went home; he tells his 
jurors that he would have died for his disobedience had the govern-
ment not fallen soon after. 187 And earlier in his defense Socrates pro-
vokes his jurors by telling them that if they were to order him, on pain 
of death, to abandon his philosophical activities, he would reply: 
"Men of Athens, I respect and love you, but I shall obey the god 
rather than you, and while I live and am able to continue, I shall never 
give up philosophy."188 
The Apology is thus the protean text of conscientious disobedience, 
and King's appropriation of the figure of Socrates seems completely 
clear. In the Crito, however, the convicted Socrates refuses to flee his 
impending execution, offering a series of arguments that he is obli-
gated to obey the laws, including his own unjust death sentence. 
These arguments, based on consent or the "social contract," on grati-
tude, on the citizen's tutelage under government, and on the dire con-
184. KING, Letter. supra note 13, at 81; see also id. at 87. As we have seen, the imagery of 
removing fetters binding us to myths and half-truths comes from Plato's Republic. 
185. See PLATO, APOLOGY *30e. 
186. KING, Letter, supra note 13, at 88-89. 
187. PLATO, supra note 185, at *32c-e. 
188. Id. at *39d. 
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sequences were everyone to disobey, have shaped all subsequent 
philosophical discussions of the subject.189 The facial contradiction 
with the Apology could scarcely be more striking, and it has puzzled 
generations of commentators. If it is wrong to disobey even unjust 
laws and court orders, why did Socrates disobey the Thirty Tyrants? 
How could he boast that he would continue to practice philosophy in 
the face of a court order to desist? On the other hand, if it is right to 
disobey an unjust edict, why should Socrates have complied with his 
death sentence? 
Recently, Richard Kraut has offered a remarkable interpretation 
of the Crito aiming to show that, far from an encomium to absolute 
obedience and submission, it is actually a powerful argument on behalf 
of civil disobedience that is fully consistent with the Apology. 19° Kraut 
focuses on Socrates' careful phrasing of his arguments for obedience in 
the Crito. Rather than concluding categorically that one must obey 
the laws, Socrates three times phrases the injunction in the alternative: 
one must either persuade the state as to the nature of justice or else 
obey. 191 Now this may suggest that Socrates is offering the unhelpful 
thought that the citizen may try to get a law changed or repealed, but 
if he fails he must obey. Since in practice one will seldom be able to 
get a law repealed, this suggestion amounts to precisely the encomium 
to absolute obedience. 
Kraut responds that the forum Socrates had in mind for persua-
sion is not the legislature but the court. 192 And persuasion is not an 
attempt to get the law changed before obeying it, but an attempt to 
argue against a criminal conviction after disobeying it. That is, Socra-
tes' position amounts to permitting one to disobey an unjust law pro-
vided one is subsequently willing to offer a defense in court, and accept 
the punishment if the jury rejects that defense. 
Kraut's reading of the Crito makes a lot of the text fall into place, 
and ingeniously resolves the facial contradiction between the Apology 
and the Crito. 193 However, there is one situation that Kraut's reading 
189. They are, however, unsound, and their unsoundness has been remarked often in the 
history of philosophy. See Luban, supra note 90, at 36-37. 
190. R. KRAUT, SOCRATES AND THE STATE 54-90 (1984). But see id. at 75-76 (concerning 
the difference between Socratic conscientious disobedience and civil disobedience for expressive 
and political purposes). 
191. PLATO, CRITO, supra note 185, at *5lc-52d. 
192. See R. KRAUT, supra note 190, at 55-56. 
193. A very different, perhaps even more persuasive, resolution of the contradiction has been 
offered by Ernest Weinrib. Weinrib suggests that Socrates never believed his arguments for obe-
dience to the Jaw in the first place. This is strikingly signalled by the fact that Socrates does not 
offer the arguments in his own voice, but rather puts them in the "mouth" of the personified 
Jaws. It is signalled equally strikingly when, at the conclusion of the dialogue, Socrates likens the 
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fails to resolve. What if a court, unpersuaded by the disobedient citi-
zen, does not punish him for disobedience but merely reiterates the 
order to obey? That, after all, is the hypothetical situation Socrates 
himself raises in which at the conclusion of his trial the jury orders 
him to abandon philosophy. He tells the jurors that he will disobey; 
but since he has failed to persuade, must he not obey? 
The problem is this. Kraut seems to assume that disobedience will 
precede persuasion: you are hailed into court because you have dis-
obeyed. Then you attempt to persuade, and if you fail you take your 
punishment. But when the court responds not with punishment but 
with another order, persuasion has failed before the choice between 
obedience and disobedience to the new order must be made. Now, 
surely, Socrates' persuade-or-obey conclusion leaves you no option but 
obedience; for it is plainly no answer to suggest disobeying the new 
court order, being hailed into court again, attempting once again to 
persuade, failing, receiving another court order, disobeying, and so on 
ad infinitum. That is simply a ruse for making an end run around the 
."obey" horn of the dilemma. No: if Socrates fails at persuasion and is 
subsequently ordered to abandon philosophy, Kraut's version of the 
persuade-or-obey doctrine requires obedience. Yet Socrates has told 
us he will disobey. And so the contradiction has not, after all, been 
resolved. 
The basic dilemma between conscience and obligation reappears, 
that is, when a citizen is faced with an unjust court order (rather than 
an unjust punishment). It is this problem, in almost precisely this 
form, that the Birmingham events raise. One political narrative, then 
- the narrative of conscientious disobedience, from Socrates on -
stands ready to offer placement to the argument between the Walker 
Court and King. 
I do not mean to suggest that when he alluded to Socrates in the 
Letter King had anything in mind as specific as the textual inconsis-
tency between the Apology and the Crito, to say nothing of classicists' 
arguments about it. Significantly, however, King invoked both dia-
logues in his Atlanta NAACP address, which (I noted earlier) 
amounts to a preliminary version of portions of the Letter: "Come if 
you will to Plato's Dialogues. Open the Cr[it]o or the Apology. See 
Socrates practicing civil disobedience." 194 In the Letter, King clearly 
arguments to Corybantic flute·playing, a technique for curing madness by inducing a musical 
frenzy in its sufferer. This is surely a strange characterization of serious arguments. Weinrib, 
Obedience to the Law in Plato's Crito, 27 AM. J. JURIS. 85 (1982). While Weinrib's may well be 
the right reading of-the Crito, I do not consider it here, since after all even if the textual problem 
is resolved in this way, the dilemma of obedience and disobedience is not. 
194. Quoted in T. BRANCH, supra note 24, at 599. 
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did have the Apology itself in mind and the dilemma between con-
science and obedience is the explicit subject matter of the Letter's ar-
gumentative portion. And we have seen King's own resolution of the 
dilemma. He offers an argument for the moral obligation to obey the 
law that is distinct from the standard arguments of the Crito,· all of 
those arguments attempt to explain the obligation to obey the law as 
an obligation to the state, whereas the fair-play argument offered by 
King explains it as an obligation to one's fellow citizens. It is a com-
munitarian, rather than a statist, argument for obedience to just laws. 
And it yields the conclusion that this obligation exists only when the 
law in question reflects "sameness made legal" rather than "difference 
made legal" - only, that is, when the law is fair. Thus, King main-
tains the tradition of the Apology by abandoning the statism implicit in 
the Crito. 
Where does the Socratic narrative of civil disobedience fit into the 
tension between mystical anarchism and natural law legalism I have 
been stressing? At first Socrates seems to belong in the second camp: 
natural law is closely tied to the rationalist ethical vision that appears 
in numerous Socratic dialogues, particularly the Euthyphro (and, am-
biguously, the Phaedo, where the rationalism assumes distinctly mysti-
cal overtones). Moreover, Plato has long been identified as a principal 
source for the natural law tradition. 
Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that neither in the Apology nor else-
where does Socrates claim to be responding to a "higher law.'' 
Rather, he repeatedly says that he is responding to a divine call. Soc-
rates tells us that the god at Delphi originally launched his philosophi-
cal career, 195 and he reveals to the Athenians that he is guided in all 
his endeavors by a divine voice, his famous daimon, that warns him 
whenever he is about to do anything wrong. 196 Socrates' daimon is 
instantly recognizable as what later ages would call "the voice of con-
science"; and it is important to realize that Socrates identifies con-
science, and therefore conscientious disobedience, with fidelity to a 
supernatural being. Viewed as the prototypical conscientious disobe-
dient, as King clearly views him, Socrates is much more the religious 
saint than the natural law adherent. And so King's Socratic self-iden-
tification falls more plausibly on the side of his mystical anarchism 
than on the side of his natural law legalism. 
195. PLATO, supra note 185, at *20c-21e. 
196. Id. at 115, 139, 141. 
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IV. THE TENSION BETWEEN RELIGION AND POLITICS 
So far my examination has stayed reasonably close to the actual 
language and range of allusion within Walker and King's Letter. In 
this section, I wish to venture further afield and explore the conse-
quences this examination carries for social change as well as legal ar-
gument. I shall be borrowing again from Benjamin's Theses, but also 
from a remarkably interesting essay on civil disobedience written by 
Hannah Arendt during the height of the Black Power, student, and 
anti-war movements, an essay that trenchantly addresses some of the 
issues I have raised.191 
A. Arendt on the Self-Misunderstanding of Civil Disobedience 
It should be clear from our foregoing examination that King's Let-
ter contains a narrative complexity and richness wholly absent from 
the Walker opinion. 198 It also, I fear, contains a fundamental self-
misunderstanding with serious consequences. King's Socratic allusion 
may serve us as a point of entry to the discussion of this self-
misunderstanding. 
In her extraordinary essay on civil disobedience, Hannah Arendt 
points out the falseness of identifying politically motivated civil diso-
bedience with the figure of Socrates (and of Thoreau as well). 199 As 
we have seen, Socrates opposes his conscience, which we might think 
of as an organ attuned to the supernatural, to the demands of the state. 
Conscientious civil disobedients are essentially solitary figures in com-
munion with divinity; they are essentially unpolitical. Thus, the ten-
sion between King's mystical anarchism and his natural law legalism 
points to a tension between conscience and politics in his thought that 
effaces the political character of the movement by comprehending it 
through supernatural political narratives. Arendt writes: 
Here, as elsewhere, conscience is unpolitical. It is not primarily inter-
ested in the world where the wrong is committed or in the consequences 
that the wrong will have for the future course of the world. It does not 
say, with Jefferson, "I tremble/or my country when I reflect that God is 
just; that His justice cannot sleep forever," because it trembles for the 
individual self and its integrity.200 
The point, once made, is obvious: there is an important sense in which 
Socrates, like Paul and Amos and Shadrach and Luther and Bunyan, 
197. H. ARENDT, Civil Disobedience, in CRISES OF THE REPUBLIC 51-102 (1972). 
198. Not to mention that the argument concerning obedience to the law is better. 
199. Arendt, supra note 197, at 58-68. 
200. Id. at 60-61 (footnote omitted) (quoting T. JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIR-
GINIA, Query XVIII (1781-85)). 
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does not belong in the same political narrative as the Southern Chris-
tian Leadership Conference. The defining relationship of Socrates' 
public stance, like the figures in the biblical narratives, was a relation-
ship with a divine voice. 201 This relationship, to be sure, manifested 
itself in a politically significant action, but in the case of Socrates that 
was happenstance. This is in no way to deny the obvious, namely that 
religiously inspired people can be canny politicians and publicists. 
Paul and Luther were. But, unless we take Paul and Luther to be 
lying at the core of their being, their political acumen accrued to them 
(to speak scholastically) per accidens; it was their God-consciousness 
that defined their public stance per essens. And so the theological nar-
ratives contained in King's Letter may actually suppress or displace an 
explicitly political self-understanding of political action by substituting 
relationships with the divinity for political relationships. 202 
Now of course churches have always been among the most suc-
cessful organs of political action, and a black political movement with-
out black churches is virtually unthinkable; the church has always 
been the most powerful and significant of black American institu-
tions. 203 Moreover, among our permanent political images of the civil 
rights movement are those of demonstrators bowed in prayer as the 
police assault them, or groups of enthusiasts singing in churches. We 
cannot imagine the movement without the hymn "We Shall Over-
come," and that is another way of saying that we cannot imagine the 
movement garbed in secular clothing. 
But it is equally important to realize that, whereas in King's reli-
gious narrative nonviolent civil disobedience was a matter of divine 
principle, others in the movement viewed it primarily as a tactic, to be 
201. This is not to deny that King, too, was guided by a divine voice. Consider his recollec· 
tions in M.L. KING, STRIDE TOWARD FREEDOM: THE MONTGOMERY STORY 134-35 (1958): 
It seemed as though I could hear the quiet assurance of an inner voice saying: "Martin 
Luther, stand up for righteousness. Stand up for justice. Stand up for truth. And lo I will 
be with you, even until the end of the world." ... I heard the voice of Jesus saying still to 
fight on. He promised never to leave me, never to leave me alone. No never alone. No 
never alone. He promised never to leave me, never to leave me alone. 
I mean to be saying only that King's revelation does not constitute the public meaning of his 
actions nor those of the civil rights movement more generally. 
202. The Situationist theorist Guy Debord writes perceptively: "Modem revolutionary ex-
pectations are not irrational continuations of the religious passion of millenarianism, as Norman 
Cohn thought he had demonstrated in The Pursuit of the Millennium. On the contrary, millena-
rianism, revolutionary class struggle speaking the language of religion for the last time, is already 
a modem revolutionary tendency which as yet lacks the consciousness that it is historical. The 
millenarians had to lose because they could not recognize the revolution as their own operation." 
The Society of the Spectacle sec. 138 (unauthorized ed. 1970). It is ironic that Debord, writing 
only five years after the Birmingham campaign, evidently believed that revolution spoke the 
language of religion for the last time in the sixteenth century. 
203. See A. MORRIS, THE ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 4-12 (1984). See 
generally T. BRANCH, supra note 24. 
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used when it could be effective but abandoned when it was not; and, 
eventually, the civil rights movement as a whole abandoned it. Dis-
couragingly, perhaps, many of the successes we ascribe to the civil 
rights movement emerged from other tactics and other circumstances, 
not the least of which were urban rioting and the rise of Black Power. 
After the Birmingham settlement, recall, Klan bombings provoked 
black riots, and these as much as Project C were an integral part of the 
chain of events leading Kennedy to introduce civil rights legislation. 
My point is not to suggest that violence is "better" or "more effec-
tive" than nonviolence (whatever that might mean); rather, it is to 
suggest that the religious strands of King's narrative make historical 
sense of only a fragment of the actual black movement, and to that 
extent they fail as a political narrative. 
Arendt points to another difficulty with attempting to embed a 
political movement in a narrative framework based on individual rela-
tionships with the supernatural: 
No doubt even this kind of conscientious objection can become politi-
cally significant when a number of consciences happen to coincide, and 
the conscientious objectors decide to enter the market place and make 
their voices heard in public. But then we are no longer dealing with 
individuals, or with a phenomenon whose criteria can be derived from 
Socrates or Thoreau. . . . In the market place, the fate of conscience is 
not much different from the fate of the philosopher's truth: it becomes 
an opinion, indistinguishable from other opinions. 204 
Religious truth "in the market place" - less metaphorically, in a sec-
ular democracy containing several powerful religious denominations 
- becomes in the long run politically indistinguishable from dogmatic 
factionalism. It cannot inspire those who do not share the faith, and 
may instead provoke or antagonize them. At the limit, religious fac-
tionalism threatens to deteriorate into the kind of convulsive doctrinal 
strife that drenched Europe in blood for centuries (and has drenched 
the Middle East in blood for most of the present decade) - precisely 
the kind of doctrinal strife that led Hobbes to urge the absolute 
supremacy of legal authority that survives in the Walker opinion. 
Indeed, perhaps the only political narrative that might yield a sym-
pathetic reading of Walker is one that begins with the violent messi-
anic movements of the Middle Ages, proceeds to religious conflicts 
such as the Thirty Years' War and the English revolution,2°5 and con-
204. ARENDT, supra note 197, at 67-68. 
205. On the role of religious factionalism in the English Revolution, see generally C. HILL, 
THE WORLD TURNED UPSIDE DOWN: RADICAL IDEAS DURING THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION 
(1972); T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (C. Macpherson ed. 1968) (1st ed. 1651); 5 D. HUME, THE 
HISTORY OF ENGLAND (1778); M. WALZER, THE REVOLUTION OF THE SAINTS: A STUDY IN 
THE ORIGINS OF RADICAL POLITICS (1965). 
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eludes by reading the American Constitution primarily as a device to 
avoid such God-intoxicated bloodletting by insisting on the absolute 
supremacy of secularizing officials.206 In this way, the Christian par-
ticularism of King's Letter ultimately reflects a deep weakness in the 
biblical narratives as a mode of organizing a universalist political 
movement. Religion eve:11tually divides a community, where egalita-
rian liberalism aims to unite it. 207 
Lest these suggestions create a misunderstanding, let me empha-
size that I have chosen to analyze King's Letter not because of its 
narrative weaknesses, but because of its overwhelming strength. More 
importantly, I have been concerned throughout this essay to stress 
that the non biblical strand of the Letter promotes a remarkably attrac-
tive - let me go so far as to say "true" - political and legal theory. 
It is my view that King has pointed the way to a truly liberal commu-
nitarianism (a political possibility that philosophers have often ne-
glected or denied208); that his fair-play version of natural law resolves 
the Platonic problem of political obligation; and that his narrative of 
American political history from Jefferson to Lincoln to Brown to Pro-
ject C displays the fourteenth amendment to our Constitution in what 
may well be the best light it can truthfully sustain.209 These are vir-
206. See, e.g., L. LEVY, supra note 7; T.J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND 
STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1986). 
207. This point should need no underscoring in a year when we have witnessed such amazing 
signs and portents as the attempt to censor The Last Temptation of Christ (Universal, 1988) and 
the Rushdie affair - including the burning of Rushdie's book in England, which went unde-
nounced by Labour politicians because the book-burners are their constituents. Rushdie, The 
Book Burning, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Mar. 2, 1989, at 26. A confirmation of the danger of religious 
particularism occurred in March 1989 when followers of impeached Arizona governor Evan 
Mecham - famous for refusing to allow Martin Luther King's birthday to become a state holi-
day - rammed through the state Republican Party a declaration "that the U.S. 'is a Christian 
nation' " and that the U.S. Constitution created "a republic based upon the absolute laws of the 
Bible, not a democracy" - a view, ironically, not far from the religious strand of King's Letter. 
Reid, Republicans Rue Mecham's Return: Arizonan's Maneuvers Embarrassing National Party 
Leaders, Wash. Post, Mar. 14, 1989, at Al2. Amazingly, the "Evanistas" were aided in ramming 
through this declaration by a correspondence between Justice Sandra Day O'Connor and a GOP 
activist from - appropriately enough - Superstition Mountain in Arizona. The activist's letter 
read in part: "Some of us are proposing a resolution which acknowledges that the Supreme 
Court ruled in 1872 that this is a Christian Nation. It would be beneficial and interesting to have 
a letter from you perhaps giving the details of that decision .... " Kamen, O'Connor Regrets 
Letter Was Used for Politics: Activist Sought 'Christian Nation' Citations, Wash. Post, Mar. 16, 
1989, at A3. Justice O'Connor replied: "You wrote me recently to inquire about any holdings of 
this Court to the effect that this is a Christian Nation. There are statements to such effect in the 
following opinions: [citations follow to three cases, in two of which no such statement is to be 
found]." Kamen, 2 Experts Fault O'Connor for Letter: Justice Said to Misquote Court Rulings 011 
Christianity of U.S., Wash. Post, Mar. 15, 1989, at A3. 
208. See, e.g .. A. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (1981); M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE 
LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982); R. UNGER, supra note 178; R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 
(1975). 
209. I believe, moreover, that King's liberal communitarianism harmonizes with the three 
premises of American constitutionalism I identified in my discussion of Walker, namely the rule 
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tues for which we may well be moved to abandon the antinomianism 
of the epistle to the Galatians and the political narrative of supernatu-
rally-inspired conscientious disobedience from Socrates through 
Bunyan. 
B. "The Myth Concerning Time" 
Having argued that political action cannot be understood through 
assimilation to religious narratives, I shall now court paradox by in-
sisting that an adequate conception of political action must recognize 
its essentially theological character. Theological, but not religious: 
what can this mean? What I wish to suggest is that certain structures 
of religious experience and religious thought correspond with similar 
structures in political experience and thought. Perhaps it is more ac-
curate to say that certain fundamental structures of experience and 
thought are capable of being articulated in either religious or political 
language, and the ready (mis)translation of politics into religious 
terms arises from this deep underlying similarity. And thus even 
when politics is translated back out of biblical and religious narratives 
- as I have suggested we must do with King's Letter - theological 
categories may offer the best description we have of the underlying 
structures of experience. We have seen, for example, that the author-
ity of laws may be experienced in either "protestant" or "catholic" 
modes - a theological distinction used to encode a political structure. 
And I shall now suggest, returning to themes I sounded at the outset 
of this essay, that historical time - the time in which political action 
and political narrative unfold - may best be understood in theological 
terms. Here I shall rely again on Benjamin's Theses, but also on the 
Letter. 
In his local narrative of the Birmingham events, recall that King 
describes the purpose of nonviolent direct action as follows. "Nonvio-
lent direct action seeks to create such a crisis and foster such tension 
that a community that has refused to negotiate is forced to confront 
the issue."210 On King's characterization, nonviolent direct action 
seeks a qualitative transformation of the community. This observation 
recalls Benjamin's remarks about revolutionary social change that I 
elaborated at the beginning of this essay. Historical time cannot be 
regarded as a homogeneous progression. Rather, it consists of periods 
of routine punctuated or in a sense even stopped by moments of crisis 
or creative tension in which the continuum of history explodes. These 
of law, popular sovereignty, and the publicity of law - precisely the premises that the Court 
found it necessary to finesse. 
210. KING, Letter, supra note 13, at 81. 
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latter are moments that Benjamin describes as "a present which is not 
a transition, but in which time stands still and has come to a stop,"211 
or, again, as "a Messianic cessation of happening [i.e., routine 
happening]."212 
This, of course, is the language of a high, and highly mystical, met-
aphysics. Benjamin is analogizing political action to the coming of the 
Messiah in Jewish theology, and it is this use of a theological category 
to explain politics on which I wish to focus. The messianic moment is 
not a part of the continuum; rather, it marks a rupture in the linear 
progression of history, bringing the previous era to a stop while at the 
same time redeeming it and preserving its meaning in a nongradualist 
Aujhebung. 
Benjamin offered this theory in order to criticize the ideology of 
the German Social Democratic Party, which held that society would 
inevitably evolve toward socialism; to illustrate the vapidity of this 
view, he sardonically quotes Wilhelm Dietzgen's book The Religion of 
Social Democracy: "Every day our cause becomes clearer and people 
get smarter."213 Because of their dogmatic and insipid optimism, the 
Social Democrats failed to mount an effective opposition to the emer-
gency of Nazism, since they discounted the Nazis as a mere waysta-
tion on Germany's route to a rosy future. Benjamin wrote in despair, 
"Nothing has corrupted the German working class so much as the 
notion that it was moving with the current. "214 "Social Democratic 
theory, and even more its practice, have been formed by a conception 
of progress which did not adhere to reality but made dogmatic 
claims."215 
·Benjamin locates the fallacy of the Social Democrats' position in 
something very abstract, namely their conception of time itself. 
J.G.A. Pocock once wrote that "the understanding of time, and of 
human life as experienced in time, disseminated in a society, is an im-
portant part of that society's understanding of itself - of its structure 
and what legitimates it, of the modes of action which are possible to it 
and in it."216 Benjamin's theory, including its critique of the ideology 
of inevitable progress, operates on this level of understanding. It is the 
insidiously corrupting concept of (inevitable) progress that provokes 
211. W. BENJAMIN, supra note 2, at 264. 
212. Id. at 265. 
213. Id. at 262. 
214. Id. at 260. 
215. Id. at 262. 
216. J. PococK, Time, Institutions and Action; An Essay on Traditions and Their Under-
standing. in POLITICS, LANGUAGE AND TIME: EssA YS ON POLITICAL THOUGHT AND HISTORY 
233 (1973). 
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Benjamin's metaphysical intervention: "The concept of the historical 
progress of mankind cannot be sundered from the concept of its pro-
gression through a homogeneous, empty time. A critique of the con-
cept of such a progression must be the basis of any criticism of the 
concept of progress itself."217 Hence the theory that progress lies in a 
Messianic ending of the past rather than in gradual change, and that 
political action is essential to create the Messianic break that redeems 
the past. 
Benjamin's debate with German Social Democracy is thus not a 
mere historical curio, for the view Benjamin ascribes to the Social 
Democrats is in fact the most pervasive myth of our time: it is the 
theory of inevitable historical progress, which King terms "the myth 
of time." King's view, in fact, corresponds with Benjamin's with un-
canny exactitude. King writes in the Letter: 
I had also hoped that the white moderate would reject the myth concern-
ing time in relation to the struggle for freedom. I have just received a 
letter this morning from a white brother in Texas. He writes: "All 
Christians know that the colored people will receive equal rights eventu-
ally, but it is possible that you are in too great a religious hurry .... " 
Such an attitude stems from a tragic misconception of time, from the 
strangely irrational notion that there is something in the very flow of 
time that will inevitably cure all ills. . . . Human progress never rolls in 
on wheels of inevitability; it comes through the tireless efforts of men 
willing to be co-workers with God, and without this hard work time 
itself becomes an ally of the forces of social stagnation.218 
This discussion of time, so strangely congruent with Benjamin's, har-
monizes completely with King's view that nonviolent direct action is 
meant to provoke moments of crisis and creative tension. These are 
precisely what Benjamin identifies as messianic moments. 
This explains a characteristic risk of nonviolent civil disobedience: 
the risk of being domesticated into a kind of permanent and hapless 
"loyal oppositionism." Protest institutionalized is protest routinized, 
protest co-opted, protest that loses whatever messianic power it may 
possess. Such protest is no longer capable of shocking and arousing 
the community. And thus it will yield only "a negative peace which is 
the absence of tension" rather than "a positive peace which is the pres-
ence of justice."219 
And indeed, since the 1970s, civil disobedience has become a 
purely symbolic and almost senseless exercise in protest-politics-as-
usual. Demonstration leaders and police typically meet beforehand to 
217. W. BENJAMIN, supra note 2, at 263. 
218. KING, Letter, supra note 13, at 89. 
219. Id. at 87. 
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work out the rules of the game so that there are no surprises, no vio-
lence, no injuries and - of course - no moments of crisis and crea-
tive tension forcing anyone to confront anything. A drastic 
illustration of the deflation of nonviolent direct action occurred in the 
1987 civil disobedience of gay activists at the United States Supreme 
Court building, protesting the Court's decision in Bowers v. Hard-
wick 220 A section of the building was cordoned off and reserved for 
civil disobedience; demonstrators lined up to enter the cordoned-off 
section to undergo arrest; police stood by to make sure that nobody 
skipped in line or tried to get arrested anywhere else. Gay activist 
Richard Mohr writes: 
The arrests themselves were a Foucauldian ballet of police power dif-
fused and modulated and of citizens disciplined and molded. In the face 
of advance negotiations with the police, affinity groups, plastic hand-
cuffs, police controlled turnstiles to the arrest site, quizzes before actual 
arrest, and school busses doubling as paddy wagons and holding tanks, 
individual dignity did not stand a chance . . . . Bull Connor, where are 
you when we need you?221 
Where indeed? The disturbing conclusion of these melancholic reflec-
tions is that dissent can hope to succeed only when it is unofficial and 
therefore most typically extra- or contra-legal. An officially recog-
nized, undisruptive Messiah who abides by the law loses the power to 
redeem. And thus the excluded voice can be included in authority's 
narrative only at the price of domesticating its redemptive force. In 
this sense, the clash between King and the Walker Court was inevita-
ble: social protest that pays "proper respect for judicial process," that 
fails to outrage, offers only a shell or husk of redemption - a shadow 
on the wall of the Cave. 
V. CONCLUSION: ON OUR WEAK MESSIANIC POWER 
My discussion of King's Letter has attempted to separate out two 
strains of his thinking, one essentially religious and one essentially sec-
ular. I have urged the priority of the secular side, both as a more 
credible form of communitarian political association and as a more 
authentic basis for political action. 
At the same time, however, I have suggested that political author-
ity and political action are best understood in terms that are thor-
oughly theological. Benjamin's Theses, upon which I have relied so 
220. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
221. Mohr, Text(ile): Reading the NAMES Project's AIDS Quilt 16-17 (unpublished type-
script, 1988). I should note that Mohr understands the purpose of civil disobedience to be the 
expression of individuality, rather than the projection of small-group politics as I have been 
arguing. 
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extensively in this essay, speaks recurrently about the messianic nature 
of political upheaval. To speak of the Messiah is to speak of a miracu-
lous intervention into human affairs inaugurating an epoch that has 
broken decisively with what has hitherto constituted our history. Ben-
jamin thus implies that political action amounts to just such a miracu-
lous intervention. 
Benjamin evokes a specifically Jewish tradition of messianism.222 
On this view the Messiah occupies a uniquely past-oriented and back-
ward-looking position: the Messiah's purpose is not only, indeed not 
even primarily, to create a better future, but rather to redeem the past 
and make meaningful the sufferings of the Jewish people. Benjamin 
speaks in the final thesis about a rabbinic tradition that prohibits Jews 
from investigating the future,223 and earlier he had emphasized that 
the spirit of sacrifice is "nourished by the image of enslaved ancestors 
rather than that of liberated grandchildren."224 Political action is 
messianic not only because it blasts the present moment out of the 
continuum of history, but because its aim is first and foremost to re-
deem the past. 
This is not meant figuratively; rather, Benjamin - like King -
suggests that political action transforms the structure of history, inter-
rupting the calendrical sequence ("homogeneous, empty time") and 
stitching together past and present, so that the present redeems the 
past by reenacting it - literally, by becoming it. 
What can this mean? The notion of discrete moments in the calen-
drical sequence fusing is, of course, a highly mystical one, and, we may 
fear, it is for that very reason a nonsensical one. Indeed, the claim that 
discrete - numerically distinct - moments are numerically identical 
is simply a self-contradiction. What Benjamin had in mind, I believe, 
was not the numerical identity of past and present, but rather bringing 
the past back to life through celebration and commemoration, particu-
larly where these include not just retelling the past but reenacting it. 
222. Benjamin wrote the Theses as a response to his friend Gershom Scholem's masterpiece, 
G. SCHOLEM, MAJOR TRENDS JN JEWISH MYSTICISM (1941). On the personal meaning of the 
Theses, and especially the famous "angel of history" thesis (Thesis 9), see SCHOLEM, Walter 
Benjamin and His Angel, in ON JEWS AND JUDAISM IN CRISIS 198-236 (W. Dannhauser ed. 
1976). The Theses were provoked by Scholem's discussions of the seventeenth-century Sabbatian 
movement, a millenarian popular movement that convulsed all of Judaism and that bears great 
similarity to chiliastic movements in Christendom, including the Anabaptists. See G. SCHOLEM, 
SABBATAI SEVJ: THE MYSTICAL MESSIAH 93-102 (1973). Yet Jewish mysticism could also be 
connected with liberalism, as was the case with Spinoza, who befriended English radicals as well 
as Dutch republicans, and defended liberalism against messianism after his excommunication by 
rabbis who would in a few years openly embrace Sabbatai Sevi. See L. FEUER, SPINOZA AND 
THE RISE OF LIBERALISM 29-30, 47-57 (1958). 
223. W. BENJAMIN, supra note 2, at 266. 
224. Id. at 262. 
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"The initial day of a calendar serves as a historical time-lapse camera. 
And, basically, it is the same day that keeps recurring in the guise of 
holidays, which are days of remembrance. Thus the calendars do not 
measure ti~e as clocks do .... "225 Here Benjamin may have had in 
mind not only the theological notion of holidays - holy days - as 
interruptions of clock-time devoted to remembrance, but also the 
thought that Nietzsche once described as the "high point of the medi-
tation": "That everything recurs is the closest approximation of a 
world of becoming to a world of being. " 226 A series of reenactments is 
the closest mortal approximation to immortality; we resurrect and re-
deem enslaved ancestors by refighting their battles for freedom. 
Here it is useful to draw an analogy to improvisatory musical 
pieces, such as jazz compositions, which are realized differently in 
each performance. No archetype exists, and we understand precisely 
what it means to say that the piece is brought to life, and indeed lives, 
only in its realizations, even though the realizations differ widely from 
one another. In the same category as jazz compositions we may place 
many folk-arts: dances that have never been notated but are simply 
handed down from dancer to dancer, epic poems in preliterate socie-
ties, folk songs, and - most to the point - folk tales and stories. 
Such stories exist only in the retelling, and their retelling, like all acts 
of collective memory, revives the past by commemorating it. The very 
etymology of the word "commemorate" - literally, commemorate, 
"to remember together" - suggests the combining of two epochs in 
one memory, and the collective character of that memory. 
Benjamin's idea amounts to the assertion that political action 
should be seen as a device of collective memory in precisely this 
sense.227 In Benjamin's words: "There is a secret agreement between 
past generations and the present one. Our coming was expected on 
earth. Like every generation that preceded us, we have been endowed 
with a weak Messianic power, a power to which the past has a 
claim."228 It is a "weak" Messianic power, of course, because no gen-
225. Id. at 261. 
226. F. NIETZSCHE, THE WILL TO POWER 330 sec. 617 (W. Kornhauser ed., R. Hollingdale 
& W. Kaufmann trans. 1967). 
227. I have discussed the relationship between narrative, poetry, political action, and collec-
tive memory in Luban, Explaining Dark Times: Hannah Arendt's Theory of Theory, 50 Soc. 
RES. 215 (1983). It is hardly surprising that Arendt's views, which I discuss in that essay, are 
close to Benjamin's: Arendt closely studied Benjamin's Theses, and in fact was responsible for 
their survival. Benjamin entrusted the manuscript of the Theses to Arendt, who smuggled it out 
of occupied France and brought it to New York; Benjamin himself committed suicide when he 
was turned back at the Spanish border as he attempted to flee the Nazis. See E. YOUNG-
BRUEHL, HANNAH ARENDT: FOR LOVE OF THE WORLD 160-63 (1982). 
228. W. BENJAMIN, supra note 2, at 256. 
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eration is truly the Messiah promised by religion; we will not end his-
tory, and believing that we can is a millenarian delusion.229 Our 
power to act is messianic nonetheless because our victorious struggle 
for the privilege of recounting the past makes sense of past suffering. 
The successful outcome of the Birmingham campaign makes sense of 
the deaths incurred by the campaign, and, to a certain ("weak") ex-
tent, the sufferings endured by 400 years of black experience in 
America. 
I am laboring this point because I believe it is central not only for a 
theory of political action but also for a theory of legal argument. It _is, 
indeed, the view of legal argument that I sketched at the outset of this 
essay: legal argument succeeds when it demonstrates that a local nar-
rative has reenacted an episode of a political narrative, and thus that 
the two have become stitched together, paired in affinity. Legal argu-
ment understood as persuasion, hence as political action, works in a 
medium of historical time that is backward-looking and redemptive in 
structure. 
This account contrasts starkly with another influential view of 
legal argument: on this view, which Ronald Dworkin has called 
"pragmatism," legal argument is entirely forward-looking, seeking 
only to create a better future and remaining generally oblivious to the 
past. 230 On this view - its similarity to the Social Democratic view 
that Benjamin excoriates should be clear - a legal argument consists 
largely of an attempt to predict and assess the likely future conse-
quences of a judicial decision; it seeks to show that a certain outcome 
would yield the best consequences overall. 
My quarrel is not with the notion that we should aim to achieve 
the best consequences overall, but rather with the notion that the best 
consequences are to be sought by peering into the future - in Frank-
furter's words, attempting "[t]o pierce the curtain of the future, to give 
shape and visage to mysteries still in the womb of time."231 Partly, 
this is because I have little faith in our predictive powers; more funda-
mentally, however, I am arguing that the consequences we seek are in 
large measure to be sought in the past - as Benjamin says, "our image 
of happiness is indissolubly bound up with the image of redemp-
229. See Luban, supra note 177, at 1684-85, 1694. 
230. R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 95, 151-75 (1986) (Pragmatism is the view "that judges 
do and should make whatever decisions seem to them best for the community's future, not count-
ing any form of consistency with the past as valuable for its own sake."). Utilitarian theories of 
adjudication are obvious examples of pragmatism. For an example of a rule-utilitarian theory, 
see R. WASSERSTROM, THE JUDICIAL DECISION (1961). 
231. F. FRANKFURTER, The Judicial Process and the Supreme Court, in OF LAW AND MEN 
39 (P. Elman ed. 1956). 
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tion."232 We achieve happiness in the thought that we have resur-
rected the memory of our dead ancestors, rescued their history from 
the defamations of their enemies, and therefore given ourselves a past 
that makes us comprehensible. 233 That is the true function of legal 
narrative. 
Perhaps the most self-conscious example of an exclusively for-
ward-looking view of the sort I am criticizing is found not in legal 
pragmatism, but in Marx. At the beginning of his greatest historical 
work, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, Marx writes, 
"Hegel remarks somewhere that all great, world-historical facts and 
personages occur, as it were, twice. He has forgotten to add: the first 
time as tragedy, the second as farce."234 Marx understands full well 
that revolutionary action is typically backward-looking, seeking to ex-
plain itself by assimilation to a political narrative of the past; but un-
like Benjamin (and me), he finds the attempt to be farcical, grotesque 
superstition: 
The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the 
brain of the living. And just when they seem engaged in revolutionizing 
themselves and things, in creating something entirely new, precisely in 
such epochs of revolutionary crisis they anxiously conjure up the spirits 
of the past to their service and borrow from them names, battle slogans 
and costumes in order to present the new scene of world history in this 
time-honoured disguise and this borrowed language. Thus Luther 
donned the mask of the Apostle Paul, the Revolution of 1789 to 1814 
draped itself alternately as the Roman Republic and the Roman Empire, 
and the Revolution of 1848 knew nothing better to do than to parody, in 
turn, 1789, and the revolutionary tradition of 1793 to 1795 . 
. . . Similarly, at another stage of development, ... Cromwell and the 
English people had borrowed speech, passions and illusions from the Old 
Testament for their bourgeois revolution. When the real aim had been 
achieved, when the bourgeois transformation of English society had been 
accomplished, Locke supplanted Habakkuk.235 
After heaping his considerable scorn on backward-looking, ghost-rid-
232. W. Benjamin, supra note 2, at 256. 
233. In this sense, the sharp distinction I have drawn between forward·looking and back-
ward-looking understandings of action and argument blurs: the redemption of the past is one of 
the consequences we hope for in the future, and, as Cover, supra note 1, insists, narratives of the 
past will include our ancestors' prophecies of their and our futures. Thus, the backward-looking 
gaze will see the future reflected in the mirror of ancestral prophecies, just as the forward-looking 
gaze will find future happiness indissolubly bound up with the redemption of past wrongs and 
sufferings. The difference in emphasis and valuation the two understandings place on the past 
nevertheless remains decisive. (My thanks to Paul Kahn for stressing to me the extent to which 
past and future are caught up with each other.) 
234. K. MARX, THE EIGHTEENTH BRUMAIRE OF LOUIS BONAPARTE 13 (C. Dutt ed. 1957) 
(3d German ed. 1883). 
235. Id. at 13-14 (footnote omitted). 
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den and superstitious revolutionaries, Marx arrives at this passionate 
exhortation: 
The social revolution of the nineteenth century cannot draw its poetry 
from the past, but only from the future. It cannot begin with itself 
before it has stripped off all superstition in regard to the past. Earlier 
revolutions required world-historical recollections in order to drug 
themselves concerning their own content. In order to arrive at its own 
content, the revolution of the nineteenth century must let the dead bury 
their dead.236 
It has been my argument that these brave and passionate words 
amount to a profound misunderstanding of our possibilities of action. 
Marx aims to eliminate superstition and theology, to disenchant us; 
similarly, legal pragmatists aim at a disenchanted view of legal argu-
ment. In my view, it cannot be done; let me turn for the last time to 
Walter Benjamin, who offered the following parable in criticism of the 
scientific and disenchanted vision offered by orthodox Marxism: 
The story is told of an automaton constructed in such a way that it could 
play a winning game of chess, answering each move of an opponent with 
a countermove. A puppet in Turkish attire and with a hookah in its 
mouth sat before a chessboard placed on a large table. A system of mir-
rors created the illusion that this table was transparent from all sides. 
Actually, a little hunchback who was an expert chess player sat inside 
and guided the puppet's hand by means of strings. One can image a 
philosophical counterpart to this device. The puppet called "historical 
materialism" is to win all the time. It can easily be a match for anyone if 
it enlists the services of theology, which today, as we know, is wizened 
and has to keep out of sight.237 
This parable returns us to King, but also to Walker. In Benjamin's 
ingenious jest we may find not only a critique of Marx, who was forced 
to smuggle in his theology in the form of a necessitarian theory of 
historical change, but a moral applicable to the Walker Court as well. 
Instead of calling Benjamin's puppet "historical materialism," call it 
"the civilizing hand of law," which must win all the time if the judicial 
suppression of social protest is to be justified. I have argued that the 
Court buttresses its preposterous deification of law's efficacy by a theo-
logical reliance on authority, and this may serve as the hunchback 
crouching beneath the table. The mirrors that disguise the hunchback 
are the unmentioned premises of constitutionalism and popular sover-
eignty, which the Court seems to evoke when it speaks of "constitu-
tional freedom," but which in reality serve only to deflect our 
attention from the authoritarian hand that drives the opinion. 
Martin Luther King, on the other hand, found no need to hide 
236: Id. at 16. 
237. W. BENJAMIN, supra note 2, at 255. 
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theology under the table. In King's case the critical portion of my 
argument has been different: it is that the real theology required by 
King is not a biblical or even Socratic doctrine of conscience, but 
rather an understanding of the essentially redemptive character of 
political action itself. And just as the real political narrative under-
writing the Supreme Court's authority ought to be the suppressed 
"protestant" narrative of constitutionalism under popular sovereignty, 
the real political narrative that embeds and fulfills the Birmingham 
campaign ought to be the narrative of constitutional egalitarianism 
and natural law legalism in Jefferson, Lincoln, and Brown. The two 
halves of my argument converge: our history - the history of black 
and white Americans, of protesters and the Supreme Court, that 
would allow us to speak of any history as a common possession - is a 
narrative of communitarian liberalism that redeems our past oppres-
sions and iniquities. It is the narrative of social protest and moments 
of "creative tension" that remind us of unkept promises and of the 
moral emergency in which we live. 
